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PREFACE: 
Of necessity, the public relations practitioner must develop 
his talents to produce a combination of social scientist, business 
administrator, philosopher, educator, and last - but hardly least -
a broker in ideas. This paper was vr.ritten partially to demonstrate 
that all of the above elements could be combined in an academic public 
relations study, But prunarily because the public relations practi-
tioner is an idea man, because he must be able not only to generate 
and propound ideas but to understand them equally well, this paper 
was wrJ.tten as a study in ideas. They are the ideas expressed in 
proxy contest campaigns, and the proxy campaign ideas are currently 
becoming an important and challenging job for the public relations 
practitioner, 
There are many people to whom tho writer is deeply indebted for 
guidance and assistance in the preparation of his thesis, But two 
people, in particular, helped him to cross over what seemed to be 
1 critically impassable roadblocks during his stay at Boston University 
and during the writing of this paper. They are Professor Howard Ste-
phenson, Chairman of the Division of Public Relations of Boston Uni-
versity, and Professor Otto Lerbingor of the same division. 
To the several others, oath at Boston University and elsewhere, 
who contributed their time, energy and advice, I express my sincerest 
thanks. 
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In the headache-filled world of big business - American style -
a myriad of problems have traqitionallyprovided ample barbs even to 
the most brilliant of management minds. But among those tribulations 
guaranteed to send continuously harassed directors and executives 
into hair-pulling paroxy~ms of despair and disquietude, contemporary 
business now provides another and most formidable type eruption. 
Management must now learn to contend with the proxy fight. Or must 
it? 
The proxy fight - euphemistically referred to as a contest -
is really a new development of an old scheme. Since there have been 
corporations, there have been people whose dissatisfaction has led 
them to try their hands at corporate revolution. Wh~erican cor-
porations were in their infancy and generally family-owned, anyone 
who could manage to buy up (or extort) enough stock to give him a 
controlling interest could intrepidly walk into the board of direc-
tors meeting and proclaim his new ownership. If challenged, he had 
but to reach deep into his pockets - or traveling case, if necessary -
and pull out the few hundred or few thousand paper stock certificates 
that he had obtained. Today, even with small publicly owned -corpora-
tions, such a feat is well without the farthest boundaries of proba-
bility. 
There are in the vicinity of six-and-one-half million stock-
holders in the United States.1 Most of these are the so-called 
"little people" of our nation,_ Forty-four percent of all stockholders, 
or 2,080,000, are in the five to ten thousand dollar salary bracket.2 
They are scattered all over the country, although the Brookings Insti-
.r 
tution reports stock ownership to be slightly higher (proportionally) 
in the western U~ited States. Most of these people own shares in only 
one or two companies - 46% in one , and 16% in two.3 
As to the companies in which they hold these shares, many have 
2 
stockholding groups numbering in the thousands, tens of thousands, and ' 
even hundreds of thousands. American Telephone and Telegraph has over 
1,200,000 different stockholders.4 Thirty other big companies reported 
in 1952 that although they could not tell exactly how many stockholders 
they had, each knew it had more tha~ 5o,ooo.5 Typical of thuse com-
panies is Montgomery Ward vlhich has 681 000 stockholders - 55,000 of 
whom hold less than 100 shares each6 - and the New York Central Rail-
road, whose 41,000 shareholders average 144.4 shares each.7 
Interesting statistics, yes, but important, too, in considering 
the development of the proxy fight. For it is because of the way cor-
porate ownership has been parceled out that the proxy fight has be-
come a necessary evil. Since corporate ownership has become so thinly 
spread, management is faced with the formidable problem of utilizing 
the proper mass communication techniques in order to keep in touch 
with the stockholders. Whereas brokers, investment bankers, and trust 
fund executors are easy to reach, and but slightly more difficult to 
influence, catering to the whims and interests of grass roots owners 
is yet another - and more recent - challenge to management. For to-
day, management is waking up to the fact that it must subscribe to 
John Jones' vote as well as the Dow Jones market analyses.B 
But if management has not had the foresight to keep wooing the 
support of ALL its thousands of stockholders, then it has dropped its 
guard and is leading with its chin for one of th~ most distressing 
3 
blows of all, the proxy fight, 
The proxy fight is simply the manner in. which a group of stock- .. ··-v 
holders, who are dissatisfied with the present management of their I 
company, form an opposition group and proceed to solicit as much sup-
port as possible from the other stockholders. They ;form a prOX'J com-
mittee which consists of the opposition group's nominees for the board 
of directors. The election of these directors takes place at the an-
nual stockholders meeting. But since most of the stockholders will 
be either unable or ~nwilling to attend and vote personally, they can 
3ign their votes ove~ to either the management or the opposition proxy 
committee 1 This is Proxy Voting. In a large corporation whose stock-
holders are numerous and extremely scattered geographically, most of 
t he voting is done by proxy. Therefore, the side that wins will be 
the side that is most successful in soliciting proxy support for its 
nominees. 
If the opposition side wins, it will elect a majority of (or all) 
Us own directors to the board. If the management committee wins, it 
will probably retain somewhat the same board it held previously. This, 
expressed in oversimplified terms, is the proxy fight, Its many rami-
fications will be discussed elsewhere in this paper. ~ 
The proxy fight becomes, therefore, a battle for the minds of men 
as well as for capital goods, warehouses, retail stores and managerial 
power. The shareholders are besieged with partisan appeals in the 
form of personal mailings and full page newspap~~ advertisements. 
There are press releases, television appearances, magazine stories, 
telephone calls and egen personal house visits from professional proxy 
solicitors. Since this is a job for highly skilled communication ex-
perts, both sides will secure the help of public relations counsel 
and professional proxy soliciting organizations• These agencies are 
,.--
r esponsible for the successful or unsuccessful promotion of a proxy 
fight campaign. 
PURPOSE OF PAPER 
Since 1954, big business has witnessed three of the boldest proxy 
f i ght attempts at unseating three of the most traditionally well en-
t .renched management groups • Two of these cases involved railroads; 
t .11e New York Central Railroad and the New York, New Haven and Hart-
f ord Railroad. The other, on which I have based the greater part of 
t..his paper, was the contest for control of Montgomery Ward, the coun-
try's second largest mail-order house. 
The questions that naturally arise when one examines 
fights are: Does there seem to be a pattern? Is there a 
these proxyl 
specific s~t\ 
of characteristics that makes a company ripe for a proxy fight? How 
does an opposition group go about soliciting stockholder support, and 
what points do they make strongest in their appeal? How does the in-
c-~bent management group go about defending itself before easily 
d~ped and frequently alienated stockholders? 
This paper will concern itself with the answers to these ques- _} 
tions. It deals essentially with the arguments that are used to 
sway the thinking of the stockholders. For this is the real work of 
public relatiops; influencing people t o adopt an attitude or take a 
course of action,9 fn!luencing shareowners to give their proxy votes 
either to the management side or to the opposition s~del 
CHAPTER II 
OF J10l'·l 'I'GOivf£RY ·v~ARD - BACE.GROUlm 
5 
CASE STUDY ~ Montgomery Ward 
I A Short History 
I 
Montgomery Ward was ~ounded in 1872 by Aaron Montgomery Ward, a 
I 
buying agent for the National Grange. Mr. Ward had become familiar 
with two of the farmers' lost trying shopping problems: the stores 
vrere usually too far from his home, and the average country store dis-
played a paltry selection! of merchandise.1 
I Aaron Ward decided that a mail-order business would provide a 
solution to both these prbblems. He and his brother-in-law, George 
I 
I 
Thorne, with their combinrd capital of $2,~00, gave birth to Mont-
gomery Ward. They were successful, and by 1880 the Thorne-Ward "wish-
1 
ing book" had become a re~lar and vlelcome inhabitant of every farmer 1 s 
bookshelf. And \.Jard 1s wal doing a ~Ji2,ooo,ooo a year business. 2 · 
I 
In 1892 the business! was taken over by Thorne's five sons. In 
1920 they sold out to James B. Duke of the .American Tobacco Company 
I 
~d Charles A. Whelan of J nited Cigar Stores. By this time, however, 
the wishing book had plenty of competition from Sears Roebuck and Com-
1 
:~any. 3 I 
I 
The 1919-20 post-Wovld War I boom skyrocketed Ward's sales almost 
I 
I 
to the ';plOO,OOO,OOO mark.1 But in the succeeding two years of post-war 
I 
I 
depression, Ward's lost '~2o,ooo,ooo. Disgusted, Duke and Whelan sold 
I 
I 
out to Wall Street Banker;s in 1921. But between 1922 and 1925 Ward's 
began to prosper again.4 I 
I Ward's now faced new problems: a clustering of retail business 
I 
I in the cities, plus stroqg competition from Sears Roebuck and J_ •. c. 
Penny, who were opening Jetropolitan retail stores. In an effort to 
stay in the race with thJ ir competitors' 500 new stores, Ward's made a 
6 
big push in the same direction. In addition to opening big-city 
I -
stores, Ward tried to mee~ the rural competition by opening 1500 
I 
I 
stores in small towns, ~ 1929, sales volume had reached more than 
$26?,000,000 as a result of this expansion.5 
Unfortunately for W~d's, it did not have experienced retailing 
executives to manage these new stores. Ward's mail-order specialists 
were unable to cope with the merchandising problems, and the stores 
I 
began to fail. In 1932, 86% of the stores were operating at a loss 
I 
and 110 were ready to close. Ward went into the red by about ~~14,ooo,ooo. 6 
I 
The Avery Era 
In 1931 the Morgan banking inter ests asked Sewell Avery to assume 
I 
the chairmanship of Ward. I Avery had built up an impressive reputation 
I 
23 president of United stJtes Gypsum Company. When other companies suc-
1 
c1.11T1bed to the deprossion distress of 1929, Avery 1-1as able to lead Gyp-. 
sum through not only unscathed but profitable. Av~ had managed to 
fortify Gypsum with large 1cash reserves, and with astounding augury, 
I 
he laid off 2,000 men just one month before the 1929 depression began. 
I 
In March, 1955, Avery was i still predicting depr essions and still build-
1 
. h 7 I ~g up cas reserves, 
By 1935, Avery's autocratic leadership had produced a new Mont-
gomery Ward. There were only 489 retail units now, but sales were way 
I 
I 
over the 1929 summit. By il940, both the number of stores and the sales 
t 
: 8 
volume were double that of 1929. I . 
Ward's soon built up la reputation for its f ast turnover of higher 
I 
executive personnel. Under Avery, Ward was fast becoming a one-man 
I 
rule, Avery was uncomproiDising m1d dogmatic. Executives who disagreed 
with his policies left, both singly and in droves, Among the first to 
leave was Walter Hoving, then vice-president and sales manager of 
Ward's and now oWner of New York's Bonwit Teller Store. Three more 
vice-presidents departed in 1939. In 1948 Wilbur H. Norton and all 
of the vice-presidents threatened to resign unless Avery ceased in-
truding into their office prerogatives. Unyielding, Avery let them 
all go.9 
Duri!lg the Vlorld War II administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt., 
Avery took great pride in thwarting the orders of the War Labor Board. 
After rejecting completely the W,L.B. 1s demand that he recognize and 
·::>argain collectively with the Ward union, Avery was bodily ejected 
from his office, cradled in the arms of two military policemen• The 
picture has become famous,10 
After the war, Avery began a policy of storaging money for his 
long predicted depression. Avery's predictions are largely based on 
his fetish for charts. In particular there is one chart that reveals 
commodity price trends as having remained relatively stable since the 
Vlar of 1812, It demonstrates that wars cause sporadic increases, but 
after each war there is a sudden drop to normalcy. Avery is still 
expecting the post-World War II normalization to occur.11 
The Ward Empire 
Montgomery Ward is the second largest mail-order and retail mer-
chandising empire in the country. Because under the Avery director-
ship it has built up assets of around ~7211 0001 000 with working capi-
tal of ~607,900,000, (of which ~327,000,000 is in u.s. Government 
Bonds) Ward's is referred to on hall Street as the 11bank with the 
department store front.nl2 
7 
Latest vJard figures report sales from its nine maU ... order houses 
and 256 catalogue offices at $297,000,000• That represents only one-
third of the total Ward sales. Ward has 586 Georgian styled retail 
chain-stores, located in every state but lfussachusetts and Delaware. 
Other Ward assets include: a paint factory at Chicago Heights, Ill-
8 
inois; a fence factory at Fort l4adison, Iowa; a farm equipment factory 
at Springfield, Illinois. The Ward properties - stores, warehouses, 
factories and real estate - are controversially valued at ~ 30,000,000 
to ~loo,ooo,ooo.13 
Since 1951, Ward's sales have dropped steadily from more than 1.1 
billion dollars to below ~~90o,ooo,ooo. In the same period, Sears Roe-
~uck, Ward 1s chief competitor, increased its sales from 2.6 billion 
dollars to 2.9 billion. Sears' net income rose 2.7% in this period 
while Ward's dropped 3.5%.14 
The Proxy Fight 
In August, 1954, 43-year-old Louis Elwood WOlfson of Miami, 
Florida, announced that he was forming an opposition stockholders' 
committee to wrest control of Montgomery ward from 81-year-old Sewell 
Avery.15 Wolfson, his family and his backers, had been quietly buy-
ing up Ward stock since 1950. However, they were using a street name; 
that is, the name of the broker who was doing the purchasing. Quite 
by accident, however, a stock transfer clerk in the New York Stock 
Exchange made the mistake of placing Wolfson's name on a recently pur-
chased block of Ward stock, and the word vras out. 
Wolfson was no newcomer to the business world. He started out 
small in his immigrant father's junk business, but by the time he was 
ready to conquer the Avery directorship he was king of a $230,000,000 
industrial empire.l6 His pers~'nal income in 1953 was ~pl,34o,ooo,l7 
Wolfson had had notable success in all of the companies in which he 
9 
took control. Among these are Merritt-Chapman & Scott, New York 
shipbuilding and the Devoe & Raynolds Paint Company. His greatest 
boost to fame before the Montgomery vJard fight, came from his revital-
izing the Capital Transit Company of 1tlashington, D.c. However, his 
methods of acquiring and controlling these enterprises seemed to pro-
vide Avery with abundant material for anti-Wolfson ~ampaigning, 
Wolfson had been getting himself set for the impending proxy 
fight with the Avery management even before he made his intentions 
nublic• He retained Allied Public Relations Associates of New York 
rmd Washington to plan his campaign. To solicit proxies for his side, 
he retained the Kissel organization of New York.18 
Avery, although traditionally publicity shy and secretive, finally 
retained Selvage & Lee Public Relations (of New York and Chicago) as 
public relations counsel, and the Georgeson Company to solicit proxies •. 19 
Foote, Cone and Belding handled the management's advertising campaign,20 
THE PROTAGONISTS PREPARE THEIR CAMPS: 
'. 
Wolfson formed the "Wolfson-Montgomery Ward Stockholders Committee," 
Its headquarters was situated in a second-floor suite of the Biltmore 
Hotel in New York City, but another office was maintained at 120 South 
La Salle Street, Chicago, The Wolfson committee's cable address was 
called 1'WOLFWARD", a rather clever alliteration of the two name seg-
ments, and almost all vJolfward documents were decorated with a key, 
symbolizing the "key to good management 11 , 21 
Neither side was able to commence active soliciting until the 
United States Securities and Exchange Commission approved its cam-
paign material. The s.E.C. finally gave management the go-ahead nod 
seven days befor~ it approved the Wolfson group material. 22 If it is 
10 
true that in a controversy "whoever speaks the first word to the world 
is always right", the s.E.C. indirectly gave the management side an 
important head start~ 23 
Once approval was secured, both sides began filling the air with 
loud claims of extensive share o~ership or control. Wolfson boasted 
that his side controlled over a million shares. Of these, Wolfson 
himself (with his family) owned 47,000 shares. He listed ownership 
of 294,000 more shares with the s.E.c.,24 But he has never, even to 
this date and after a Senate Banking Committee Investigation, dis~ 
closed the identity of the people owning the other 650,000 shares.25 
The Ward directorship, on the other hand, claimed om1ership of 
about 92,000 shares, only about 1,4% of the total voting shares out-
standfug. 26 The largest single tnanageme~t holdings were owned by 
' i . 
Sewell Avery, some 63,566 shares. He obtained most of these in 1934 
when the Morgan interests offered him a stock option as a reward for 
his startiing successes at Ward•s. 27 Another 24,851 shares were owned 
by the DeSoto Securities Company, whose president, Percy B. Eckhart, 
personally owned another 609 shares. Eckhart was also a member of the 
Avery board. The remaining 3,164 shares were distributed among the 
th d . t 28 o er seven ~ec ors. 
11 
Giving Wolfson the benefit of the doubt in his claim to control 
·1.,000,000 shares of Ward stock, and adding to this the 92,000 shares 
definitely controlled by manaiiPlllont, the affiliations of more than 85% 
of Ward's 6, 703,932 voting shares were still at large. Both sides were 
faced with the herculean task of soliciting support from the 68,000-
odd stockholders.29 Thus, in March, 1955, began the million dollar 
struggle for control of Nontgomery Ward• It ended a little over a 
month later, on April 22, at Chicago's Medina Temple.· There,, before 
2500 of the company's stockholders 1 Wolfson met his Waterloo, while 
soon-to-be-retired Avery clasped his aged hands in the air and enjoyed 
his last great corporate victory.3° 
f)ME PERTINENT ASPECTS OF THE PROXY FIGHT: 
At this point it is necessary to consider some of the technical 
c~etails that had direct bearing on all the proxy fights . mentioned in 
this paper. 
F~GULATION BY THE SECURITIES M1D EXCHANGE COMMISSION~ 
Management and opposition stockholder committees can send out 
proxy soliciting material only after it has been approved by the United 
States Securities and Exchange Commission. Although the rules affec-
t.i.ng proxy solicitation will only be outlined in this paper, they are 
so exacting as to even specify the size type to be used in printing 
proxy statements. The rules are as followst 
1. The proxy can be revoked by the shareholder at any time. 
2. Those making tho solicitation~ whether management or not, 
must be named. Also to be named are those paying for the 
solicitation; and how the solicitation is being made must 
be explained. 
J, Complete data must be included on anyone nominated for 
the board of directors, including his occupation, how 
many shares he holds, what salary (if any) he will be 
paid, and his business experience, 
4, Except under exceptional circumstances, proposals of 
minority stockholders must be included in the manage-
ment proxy, 
5. A full description of any actions to be taken on pen-
sions, -refundings of exist:L"lg securities, any mergers 
or acquisitions and any other proposed actions that 
would materially affect tho shareholders, also must 
be reported, 
6. There are regulations determining whether or not 
brokers holding shares for their clients can vote 
these shares if they do not get written permission 
from the owners, In the case of the ·w·ard proxy 
fight, brokers who did not get certification from 
the owners could not vote the stock, 31 
12 
There is an interesting sidelight from the Ward campaign that de-
rives notoriety partially from the fact that Avery was able to pull 
off a shrewd maneuver, and yet stay within the bounds of S,E.C, regu-
lations, Having received S,E.C. approval for his campaign material, 
Avery combined some of it in the Montgomery Ward Annual Report to the 
stockholders, Since the annual report is paid for by the company and 
is sent to all the stockholders, it proved an effective means of get-
ting off an extra campaign salvo at Wolfson,32 Wolfson's anti-Avery 
13 
campaign made an occasional reference to this affair. He tried to 
make it appear that Avery had put one over on the stockholders by 
spending their money to expedite the management,ts campaign. 
FACTORS THAT SEEM TO MAKE A CORPORATION SUSCEPTIBLE TO PROXY FIGHTS: 
Business Week Magazine, having made a study of the recent proxy 
fight trend, has come up with the following set of conditions, most 
or all of which seem to characterize the corporations that have had 
proxy fights. 33 Each characteristic is listed with the corresponding 
condition of Montgomery Ward just before the proxy fight began!t 
1. ~es Falling 
In the past four years Ward's sales have dropped 
steadily from more than ~1.1 billion to below 
~900 million. In the same four years, sales of 
Ward's chief competitor, Sears Roebuck & Company, 
rose from 2.6 billion to 2,9 billion. 
2. Earnings Off 
Since 1931, Montgomery Ward has earned $672 million~ 
Sears Roebuck in the same period has earned $1,315 
million.35 
3. Dividends Off 
¢ince 1931, stockholders of Montgomery Ward's 
principal competitor have received ~~152.00 in 
dividends for each share held, compared with only 
$51.00 for each share held by Montgomery Ward 
stockholders • 36 
4. Scattered Stockholders Who Seldom Hear From Management 
---- ,;;;_,.....;..;..;.;.._....,.;.. __ ........_.. ·-- - --
None of the research reveals any direct data on 
this subject; however, we can make some observa-
tions. c.f. footnote37 
5~ Directors Holding Only~ Blocks of Shares 
As previously reported, the Avery board of 
directors held only about 1.4% of the voting 
stock, The largest single block was held by 
Avery personally, amounting to 631 566 shares. 
The other director-held blocks are as follows: 
100, 125, 125, 175, 5oo, 787, 1252.38 
6 • Many Stockholders I!,olding Small Blocks 9!_ Stock v 
Out of th~ 67 1 732 stockholders, over 55 1 000 held 
less than 100 shares. There are two classes of 
voting stock outstar.ding: 6,502,378 shares Com-
mon, and 201,554 shares Class 11A11 Voting.39 
?. Sto~~ Sel~ing at~ Below :Its Book Value (book value 
is the dim-r ence oetween a corr!pany' s tang:::..hle assets and 
its linbilit.ies, divided by the total number of shares 
' ----outstar.ding .• , 
Ward stock had a book value of J92.37 jn 1953. 
It sold for less than $80 a share . Its nearest 
competitor's stock had a book value of only ~39.50 
d ld f b t th . 40 an so or a ou c same pr1ce, . 
8, Lar~c ~iquid Asset~ 
On January 31, 1955, Ward reported net working 
capital of $608 million made up as follows:41 
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Cash••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• $ 23.0 million 
u.s. Goverr,ment Securities ••• • •• , •••• •• 304.2 million 
Time Payme~t and other Accounts 
Receivable, ••••••••••••••••••••••• 147.0 million 
Inventories and Prepuid Costs, ••••••••• 216,2 million 
Total Current Assets •••••••••••••• $690,4 million 
Total Current Liabilities ••••••••• 82,4 million 
Net Current Assets ••••••••••• $608.0 million 
9. Company's !ey D:!-reotors ~ ]0 's ::::.£ §0 • s 42 43 
Sewell Avery 81 Pcrr~y Ec:(hurt 
Philip Clarke 69 George Ea~"twood 
David A,. Crm-.r.fo::-d 75 Edmund ¥.rider 
Solomon A, S1~li th 77 John A, Barr 
c. H, Shaver 56 
Stock "-' (;~~ s.~; Rm~ "?rior ~:;o Prox;;~ Fight 
-- ...... --- ... -:L. - · - -· 
I:. :is known that liTolfson was able to bt·y up 
Hard stock at a low of $65.00/share before 
hi~ proxy .fight jntentions " ere disclosed, 
but after dis clo:;urc, the stock 1-rent to as 
high as ~~87 ,00/share-.. 44 





. Cumulative voting op~atcs something like proportional representa-
tion. And among corporation thinkers , t here is at least as much con-
troversy concerning its r~lative meri~s and abuses, Theoretically, 
cumulative voting is desjgned to enable the majority shareholders of a 
1.6 
corporation to have a greater say in choosing its directors. But at 
the same time it is supposed to enable minority groups to elect a 
number of minority directors proportional to their strength. In fact, 
it is even possible for a minority group to gain control of a corpo-
rate board with a combination of sage and fortuitous cumulative voting.45 
Here is hoior it works: 
Under straight voting, a stockholder has one vote for every share 
of voting stock he owns, In the case of a proxy fight the side re-
ceiving 51% of the total vote would elect the entire board, while an 
opposition side polling as much as 49% would be unable to elect even 
one, 46 
Under cumulative voting, a stockholder has as many votes per 
share as there are directors to be elected, If, as in the case of 
Hontgomery Ward, a man has one share and there are nine men on the 
board up for election, he has nine votes. The fewer the number of 
directors to be elected, the fewer number of votes a shareholder has. 
This is an important fact to bear in mind when the stagger system is 
discussed later,47 
The total number of votes a shareholder has under cumulative 
voting rights may be parceled out in any way he chooses. He may di-
vide.; thor.l ovenly nnone o. nunbcr of nOiilinccs, .:unong only n few, or 
cumulate them entirely on only one. When he votes by proxy, however, 
he generally relinquishes this choice to the di5cretion of the proxy 
committee to which he gives his proxy. In the Ward proxy fight, stock-
holder proxies were therefore solicited by both the management commit-
te and the opposition committee. Since there were about 6t million 
voting shares outstanding, and there were (finally) all nine directors 
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up for election, then if every shareholder voted (by proxy, in person 
or otherwise} there was a total possible vote of 9 x 6i million, or 
about 58 million votes.48 
To see how cumulative voting operates, let us set up a hypotheti-
cal situation with Montgomery ~vard. Suppose that the management com-
mittee roceives proxies representing four million shares, or 36 mil-
lion votes, (9 x 4 million} and suppose that Wolfward receives proxies 
~epresenting 2.5 million shar6s, or 22 1 5001 000 votes. If Mr. Avery 
decides to spread his 36,0001 000 votes equally over ALL his nine man 
slate of nominees, each would therefore get 4 million votes. But 
vJolfson, if he tries to elect only five of his nominees, could take 
control under these circumstances. He could cumulate his 22,500,000 
votes equally among only five, thus giving each a total vote of 
4,5oo,ooo. R~ve of Wolfson's nominees would beat out five of Avery's 
nominees, and Wolfson with only a minority of the vote would take con-
i-,rol.49 
As it actually worked out, the management voted a proxy repre-
senting 4,033,481 shares, and the Wolfson committee voted a proxy 
representing 11 793,398 shares. Wolfson cumulated his votes oh only 
three nominees and won them, Management easily won the other six.5° 
THE SYSTEM OF STAGGERED (or classified) ELECTIONS: 
Having discussed the system of cumulative voting used by Ward, we 
can now turn to a discussion of staggered voting which is intimately 
related to the Montgomery Ward Case. The staggered system of elec-
tions, previously allowed by section 35 of the Business Corporation 
Act of Illinois, was used by Montgomery Ward in electing its board 
of directors. Ward has a nllle man board, and the by-laws provided 
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for the election of only three directors each year. By thus stagger-
ing the election of directors, Avery himself came up for re-election 
only once every three years.51 Coupled with the cumulative voting sys-
tern, the staggered elections enabled Avery to retain his perennial 
domination of Ward fro 1931 to 1955. 
Following the discussion of cumulative voting, it is apparent 
that in order for an opposition nominee to beat out one of the incum-
bent management nominees for a seat on the board, he would have to get 
more than 33 1/3 per cent of the total vote cast if only three direc-
tors are to be elected. And since Avery, as chairman, could always 
cumulate all the management votes on himself, Wolfson would have 
needed more than 66 2/3 per cent of the total vote in order to get 
Avery's seat.52 This would have been practically impossible. And 
even if Wolfson had accomplished the impossible, there still would 
have remained at least six of the old management directors as a majo• 
rity block to out-vote him on any issue. Under Ward's staggered sys-
tem it would have taken two consecutive years of opposition victories 
even to begin to change the board~S3 
Understanding this and realizing his slim chances under the stag-
ger system, Wolfson challenged the constitutionality of Section 35 in 
the Illinois Courts (Montgomery Ward is chartered as an Illinois cor-
poration). Wolfson also demanded that the ter.ms of office of the 
entire nine man board be held to expire by the date of the 1955 
annual stockholders meeting, and that every position be held open 
for election.54 
Wolfson won his case in the Circuit Court. Ward appealed to the 
Illinois Supr~me Cour.t 1 but Wolfson's case was upheld there also. 
Section 35 and the Ward by-laws calling for staggered elections were 
held in violation of the Illinois state constitution• Management was 
forced to arrange for the election of all nine directors, and to no-
tify all the Ward stockholders of this change in policy,55 
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Vlolfson took immediate advantage of the decision by following it 
up with a mock 11Post~gram"• This was a mailing fourteen inches long 
and eleven inches wide, informing stockholders of the decision, and 
telling them that now they could vote for the entire Wolfson slate 
this year.56 
CORPORATE DEMOCRACY: 
Having discussed cumulat~ve votli1g as it affects the stagger sys-
tern, it is now obvious why their combination creates a nearly impreg-
nable :wall of exclusion to tQ.e minority voters. The fewer the number 
of directors put up for election (under such a combined system) the 
greater percentage of votes a minority group would need to elect even 
one director.57 For example, suppose that the X Company has 5000 
shares outstanding, a complete fivo-mah board up for election, and a 
proxy fight in progress, Suppose that the incumbent management re-
ceives proxies representing 4000 shares, or 201 000 votes. Suppose 
that the opposition committee "votes a pro:xy11 representing only 1000 
shares or 5000 votes, . By cumulating its votes on only one nominee 
from their slate, the minority group can be assured of electing at 
least one representative on the board. 
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But, suppose the management uses a stagger system in which only 
two directors are put up for election. With the same voting results, 
the opposition committee would fall short of electing a representative 
by 5001 votes. Repeating such conditions over years and years, the 
present management group is bound to retain permanent cont~ol -- even 
over the wishos of a very large segment of the stockholders. 
Boiled down to very simple figures, this is what Wolfson was 
talking about when he accused Avery of depriving the Ward voters of 
their rights under corporate democracy.58 
THE MANAGEMENT NEGOTIATION viTTH THE AFL TEAMSTERS UNION: 
This is an aspect of the proxy fight that seemed to have deeper 
implications than most casual observers realized. Even now, the truth 
seems to be buried •way down at the bottom of the ballot box. 
The situation came about when Sewell Avery, long regarded as a 
foe of organized labor, negotiated a very opportU11e and timely peace 
with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, A.F.L. Mr_ Avery and 
Dave Beck, president of the brotherhood, signed contracts giving the 
teamsters union bargaining power for 151 000 of Ward's 52,000 employ-
ees. In return for the union-favoring contract, Beck assured Avery 
that the 13,500 shares the brotherhood held in its welfare fund would 
be voted for the management committee.59 
The actual negotiating was done by John Barr, now president and 
chairman of the Ward Board. Directly after the deal was negotiated, 
Wolfson said that Avery is "an old anti-union man who compromised with 
principles and committed the greatest sellout in corporate history."60 
But at a Senate Banking Committee Investigation of proxy fights, Barr 
21 
adamantly denied Wolfson's charges that Avery 11bought11 support from the 
61 
union. 
Where over six and a half million shares of voting stock are in-
valved, 13,500 shares seem a pittance to quibble about. But Wolfson did 
?lenty of quibbling about it, possibly for the following reason. Accord-
ing to Business Week, word had been circulating around Wall Street that 
t,here were 1001 000 shares in hands friendly to the union, in addition to 
the two million dollars worth of Ward stock the union held in its wel-
~e fund.62 Such a sizable block, if voted for management, might have 
Fosed a threat to Wolfson at that point of the campaign. As it turned 
out, it wouldn't have made much difference. 
But such a deal is likely to present itself as a serious omen to 
nanagement. For if unions come to hold large blocks of voting stock, and 
if managements must be constantly on their guard for proxy fights, the 
union automatically gains a powerful bargaining-table weapon. 
PJBLIC RELATIONS TECHNIQUES: 
The purpose of this paper is not really a detailed description of 
the various public relations procedures used by both management and Wolf-
ward. It may be, however, both interesting and instructive to examine 
some of the problems peculiar to each side, and then to take a look at 
what techniques were employed as solutions. 
Techniques are merely techniques, however; one can employ the most 
efficient and expeditious techniques and still prepare a bad campaign. 
At least half the battle is in preparing the arguments. The techniques 
are simply the means used to publicize the arguments. Any way you look 
at it, or to whatever size one attempts to blow air and type into extol-
ling the tttechnique 11 aspect,. there are just so many possibilities. And 
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it is quite obvious that the gamut of techniques was pretty well ex-
hausted in the Montgomery Ward campaign. 
PROFESSIONAL PROXY SOLICITATION: 
Proxy solicitation is defined as ~ action intended to influence 
the giving of a proxy. Proxy solicitation can be conducted by mail, 
telephone, telegraph, radio, TV, newspaper advertising and in person, 
but all proxy solicitation is regulated by the rules o£ the Securities 
and Exchange Commission•63 Proxy solicitation has been carried on for 
years; however, it is only since the recent trend of proxy fights that 
this work has become of great and specialized significance. 
For the Montgomery Ward campaign, two of the biggest proxy solici-
ting firms were retained. The management's proxies were solicited by 
the Georgeson Company 1 the same company that had solicited Jr oxies for 
the management committee in the New York Central Railroad proxy fight. 
The Wolfson committee engaged the Kissel Organization. The Kissel Or-
ganization had been retained by the victorious opposition Young commit-
tee in the New York Central proxy fight.64 
The Kissel Organization was retained by Wolfward at ~5,000 plus 
expenses; the expenses were figured at about $301 000. Kissel used 
about 60 of its own employees to solicit proxies, but they were re-
inforced by people hired by Wolfward and by employees of Allied Public 
Relations Associates. There is no way of determining exactly how many 
people were actively engaged in soliciting proxies for the Wolfward 
~ommittee, but a conservative estimate would be several hundred.65 
The Georgeson Company was ret9ined on a fee plus expenses basis 
estimated at ~50,000. It employed about 70 of its own people to soli-
cit proxies. However, the management committee was known to have had 
2.3 
an additional 2,000 "volunteers" recruited from the company. The Ward 
proxy statement said that their work would be done on company time, and 
that the company might reimburse officers and employees for expenses 
incurred in solicitation.66 
These "amateur solicit6rs 11 did the delicate job of soliciting by 
telephone and by personal visits to the homes of the stockholders •. 
Therefore, both committees spent considerable time and effort in 
training them properly~ Montgomery Ward, for example, prepared a spe• 
cial seven page pamphlet entitled General Information for Proxy Solici-
tors. Every solicitor for management, whether employed by Ward or 
Georgeson, was given one of these pamphlets which described in detail 
what to do in every possible contingency. It was included in a proxy 
solicitor's kit, which ihcluded:67 
1. The pamphlet described above 
2. Copies of the Proxy Statement containing the Notice 
of the Annual Meeting, and forms of proxy and letters 
which had already been sent to the stockholders 
.3. Copies of any proxy material distributed by oppo~ 
sition group 
4. The Annual Report containing coniplote financial 
information about the Company 
Ward cmploybes wete divided into teams, each team having a captain 
who could relay answers to more difficult questions. The solicitors 
were sent out with the following note of encouragement: 
There is nothing mysterious to the art of solicitation. 
All you need is a knowledge of your subject, a conviction 
that you are fighting for the right side, a willingness 
to work, and a reasonable ability to get along with people.68 
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Solicitors were admonished against making any statements not found in 
the committeets printed material, against antagonizing the stockholder 
in any way, and even against trying to impugn the reasoning of a dog-
matic opposition supporter. Home residence visits and calls were ad-
vised in preference to office visits, and polite persistence deemed 
preferable to high-pressure techniques.69 But probably the most dif-
ficult thing the solicitors had to master was the Georgeson Company's 
ingenious - but rather intricate - system of letter-card-bookeeping~ 
This is too involved to be discussed here. It is simply a system by 
which both the Ward offices in Chicago and tho Georgeson Company in New 
York could have the same information at the same time as to the progress 
of the solicitation.70 
It is impossible to minimize the effect of this sort of personal-
ized solicitation. For many of the stockholders it was probably the 
first time they really felt important to management, or to potential 
management. Stockholders were contacted by both committees, regard-
less of the smallness of their individual holdings. Since it is the 
last dated proxy that counts, most stockholders were contacted several 
times with pleadings to change their minds and vote "for our side". 
In fact, the race became so annoying that management solicitors were 
told to begin conversations by apologizing for all the bothersome 
campaigning}1 
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THE GRAND TOURS : 
While lesser figures were out ringing doorbells and dialing tele-
phone numbers, the leaders of the two committees were doing some soli-
citing work themselves. Louis Wolfson's plan called for a series of 
"coffee cuptt conferences. Wolfson spoke in lo.rge metropolitan centers 
where large blocks of stockholders were concentrated. Among these 
cities were New York, San Francisco, Philadelphia, Chicago and Boston.72 
A typical Wolfson coffee cup conference would consist of a short 
introductory speech by one of Wolfson's business associates, such as 
Frank Leahy, former Notre Dame football coach. Wolfson would then take 
the podium and in his slow, deJ.iberate, Southern drawl, proceed to ex-
tol the virtues of the Wolfson Rescue Plan and to point out the short-
comings of the Avery management. This would last about half an hour •. 
After that, Wolfson would announce that he was open for questions from 
the audience. The audience had been supplied with small cards on which 
the stockholder was asked to write his name, his question and the num-
ber of shares he held. These questions were colledted and taken up to 
the dais where David Charnay, President of Allied Public Relations 
Associates and Wolfson's personal public relations consultant, would 
sort them out and pass on to ~volfson the ones to be ansuered. 73 
This was an effective technique for rug.ning the meeting, except 
it backfired occasionally. In New York, one indignant stockholder de-
manded that he be allowed to ask his question directly from the floor, 
and then accused Charnay of censoring the unflattering questions •. 
That meeting finally broke up in pahdemonium.74 
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After the question and answer period, which generally lasted an 
hour or more, Wolfson would announce that coffee was being served and 
he would be happy to meet and talk with any and all stockholders. Even 
an ardent pro-Avery supporter would have had to admit that the net effect 
was very pleasant; particularly if the coffee and cake were tasty. 
Avery, on the other hand, had never been the type of person to go 
in for public meetings, In fact, it was the advent of the proxy fight 
which caused him to hold his first question-and-answer press conference 
in ten years.75 Avery's personal campaigning was done by 42-year-old 
Edmund A. Krider, president of Ward under the Avery management. Kri-
der vmnt in for the stump speaking method. His talks can best be des-
cribed in his own words: 
11 I come to a city ••• and I make a series of appoint-
ments with small groups of a dozen to twenty people. 
And some of them aren't even stockholders. They're 
just important men whose interest we want to stir up 
with the facts. I 1ll tell you something you may not 
believe, but I don't even ~ention the subject of 
proxies to these people. 11 7 
Krider was a frequent spoke$man for the management team all through the 
campaign. 
THE ADVERTISING CAMPAIGN: 
Because newspaper advertising, particularly in metropolitan areas, 
is such an effective means of reaching large numbers of people, both 
sides relied on it heavily. Writing on the use of newspaper advertising 
in proxy fights, George Hammond, executive vice-president of Carl Byoir 
Associates said, "In thG very process of preparing such advertisements, 
there is a crystallization of arguments which definitely illuminates 
the points at issue.n77 
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There is a striking similarity between the ads prepared £or manage-
ment and opposition committees in the Ward proxy fight and the ads pre-
pared for opposing committees in the New York Central fight, 78 We can 
see this merely by comparing the titles of some of the ads used in each 
campaign. 
Montgomery Ward Proxy Fight79 New York Central Proxy Fight80 
Avery-Management 
Ii1cufu.ocn't l'•IanageLcnt .~\.ds 
White-Management 
1. "Pie in the Sky or Cash •••••••••••• 11You do not Learn Railroading 
2. 
in the B.:mk" at Palm Beach" 
11Are We Losing our Sense 
Fair Play?" 
of •••••••• "Too Good for Stockholde-rs -
Ht;n.; Does Mr. Young Make This 
Inside Deal Jibe with Morals 
and Methods?tt 
3. "The Dollar and Cents Re- ••.••••••• "~Jhat Hanner of Man is Robert 
1. 
cord of l'J!'. Wolfson" R. Young?" 
Insurgent Management Ads 
Wolfson-Montgomery Ward Young-New York Central 
"You Can 1 t Afford Present •••••••••• 11\rJhy New Top Direction of the 
Management" New York Central is so Urgent-
ly Needed" 
"Now You Answer Some Questions* •••• "Bewarc This Ruse--Last Minute 
I) 
Mr. Av~r~ Tricks to Whitewash Central's 
\Vhito 11 
Without describing the actual contents of each ad it is possible 
to make the following observations. Tho newspaper advertising served 
as a forum for public debate of the major issues. Both incumbent 
groups and opposition groups made use of the ads to publicly cast as-
persions on the past records of the opposing group's principal figures, 
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and to reinforce their own management records. In both proxy fights, 
ads were used to supply testimonial support from committee and non-
committee-member prestige figures, 
The insurgent groups made frequent use of the ads to refute the 
charges of the incumbent committees, An insurgent committee is always 
at a disadvantage since the incumbent committee has the prestige of 
office to lend greater weight to its statements. The insurgents, 
however, could use the ads to show the public how the incumbent man-
agement had done a poor job, and that they (insurgents) could turn in a 
much better performance if given a chance, 
THE MAIL CA11P AIGN: 
Since mail is the surest way of reaching even the most distant 
shareholders, the mail became the campaign mainstay for both sides. 
In addition to the proxy notices sont out by both sides and the annual 
financial report sent out by the management committee, there were over 
thirty combined pieces of literature added ~o the campaigns. These 
included letters signed by Wolfson or Avery, reprints of full page 
newspaper advertisements, reprints of magazine articles, booklets, 
proxy statements, opinion polls, and letters signed by various other 
people.Bl 
Thenailed literature comprises part of the material for the con-
tent analysis in this paper, In general it served the same purpose as 
the newspaper advertising; i.e. a crystallization of the arguments of 
both sides, refutations, accus.J.tions, exhortations to vote for one side 
or the other, comments of past performances and plans for the future. 
There are but two speculative observations which seem to be worth men-
tioning here. 
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When the Wolfson mailings are carefully examined, one gets the im-
pression that Wolfson tried to establish a mutual identification with 
the great body of stockholders. That is, he wanted to establish him· 
self in their eyes as a fellow stockholder who was truly looking out 
for the interests of his friends and peers, at the same time that he 
was admittedly in this fight to make moneyc This impression is partial-
ly formed from a comparison of the salutations and general approach of 
the Wolfson letters with those of the Avery letters. All of the Wolfson 
letters were prefixed by "my dear fellow stockholder" or an equally soli-
citous salutary expression. On the other hand, Avery's letters were al- _./ 
most all of the 11To all Montgomery Ward Stockholders" type, the sort of 
thing one might expect from a somcwh.:->.t authoritru' ian pedagogue who, in 
attempting to protect his gullible students against what he considers 
unfounded theories, prefixes his lectures in such a way as to imply the 
unquestionable finality of his own theories. 82 
In anot.her respect there was striking si:nilarity between the two 
sets of letters. Both sides would use evel7 mail.i.ng to advise the 
stockholders that it was the last dated proxy th~t counted. And if by 
some unfortunate accident the stockholder had happened to sign the other 
side's proxy, he could sign "this one" and rectify his mistake. 
CHAPTER III 
C.P.SE SWDY OF I'1:0NTGOivJERY \JAl1D - Cm !TEJI?I' .ANALYSIS 
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Content analysis is a research technique for the objective, system-
atic and quantitative description of the manifest content of communica-
t . 1 J.on. In this paper a content analysis is used to break down system-
atically the written proxy solicitation comn1unications of both the 
management and the opposition groups into the basic arguments (or ap-
peals) that were presented by e~ch. By comparing the relative fre-
quency with which these various argQ~ents appear in the communications, 
we can get a rough estimate of their respective jmportance. 
One must be careful, however, not t o r <)ad too much into an analy-
sis of arguments based on their r elative frcq~ency of appearance. We 
must assume that different stockholders ~re more interested in some 
aspects of the proxy fight than othersfl For this ranson a stockholder 
who is particularly interested in dividends, f or exmnple, is likely to 
be influenced most by arguments pertaining to r li .riclends, regardless of 
...., 
the frequency with lvhich such argunents 0.ppoarc '· Since no research was 
done on tho effectiveness of the two campai~ns on the stockholders, any 
statements 3.S to the effectiveness or infl'i..wnc ~~ng power of any particu-
lar argumer:t or series of arguments would be completely out of bounds 
for this paper. 
All we can tell from this pnrticular analy~is is that certain 
themes were stressed (by frequency) more thru< others a We can assume 
that the people who prepared the argument~ and designed the over-all 
campaigns considered the most frequently appearing themes to be gener-
ally important to their respective side~3 
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We can observe that in communications of this nature all arguments 
are either for one side or against the other side. It is therefore 
reasonable to state that a campaign composed of more 11pro-our-side 11 ar-
guments than "anti-your-side" arguments, is essentially a pro-our-side 
campaign. That is, the people who designed the campaign apparently con-
sidered it more effective to reinforce their own side rather than to jab 
barbs into the opposing side. Whore a campaign was composed mostly of 
anti-your-side arguments, we could say that tho people who designed 
this one apparently considered it less important to extol the virtues 
of their ovm side than to emphasize strongly the vices of the opposing 
side. 
To spend an entire content analysis trying to determine whether a 
proxy fight campaign was more pro than anti would amount to an unecon-
omical expenditure of time. A content analysis is a long, tedious job. 
Even if the results were such as to give highly reliable assurance that, 
for example, the management side '1s campaign was basically pro-management 
rather than anti-opposition, this information would leave the research-
er almost as uninformed as before. A good analysis therefore tends to 
search deeper• This one tries to seek out each side's most important 
arguments, both pro and con, and then attempts to explain their meaning 
and value. 
Once the major arguments have been discovered in the Montgomery 
Ward campaign material, examples from two other recent proxy fights will 
be presented to show whether there is something of a standard technique 




The content analysis method itself is based mostly on ideas sug-
gested by Bernard Berelson in his book, Content Analy~is ~ Communica-
tions Research. Berelson•s method, somewhat simplified, is as follows; 
1. Familiarize yourself with the material you want 
to analyze. 
2. Figure out what you want to prove about this 
material and formulate general hypotheses .• 
3. The . analysis will test the hypotheses; the 
hypotheses are really your assumptions about 
the material. 
4. From the hypotheses, formulate categories that 
will test these hypotheses. 
5. By carefully examining the content itself, 
pick out the themes or indicators which will serve 
to determine exactly what will be placed in each 
category. 
6. · pecide on how you want to go about quantify-
ing the material you place in these categories. 
7 • Start analyzing. h 
THEMES: 
For this particular problem it was decided that the analysis 
would be based on the number of times various themes appeared in the 
material. A theme was defined as an assertion about a subject-matter, 
whose minimal form of expression would be a complete sentence.5 The 
maximum form ot expression would be a paragraph. That is, some themes 
were c omposed of several partial subject-matters, and it frequently 
took an entire paragraph for the copywriter to tie them together and 
make clear his major point or theme •. 
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Over-all~ there are three types of themes. . There are themes that 
present thoughts fa-vorable to 11our11 side, themes that present thoughts 
unfa.vorable to "your" side, and themes that just present factual mater-
ial which, within the paragraph they appear, do not tend to favor either 
side. These latter are the neutral themes. They are joined, in the 
analysis categories, by themes which were too indefinite to be cate-
gorized as either definitely pro or anti. 
CATEGORIES - SUB-CATEGORIES: 
.Almost every theme used in t.he campaign material recurs time and 
again, but in multiple variations. A sub-category is a kind of major 
classification of a homogeneous group of themes. It is the job ot the 
analyst to put the themes in the proper sub-categories as he discovers 
them. However, he cannot do this unless he has an idea of all the vari-
ous types of themes he must place in each particular sub-category. By 
carefully scrutinizing the material, he can f;ind "indicators", i.e. 
examples of the variations of one theme, all of which must be placea 
into the same sub-category.6 
A sub-category is therefore defined by the variations of a theme, 
called indicators, that go into it. A category is composed of one o~ 
more sub-categories.. Whereas the categories are essentially derived 
from the hypotheses (since they must t est the hypotheses), the sub-





Finding the right indicators and rigidly defining the sub-categories 
is a big job and a tedious one. But the success of the analysis depends 
upon how well the analyst does this part of his job. 
QUANTIFYING OR SCORING: 
The recording unit (the unit of quantification) is the theme.. The 
context unit (the amount of material that must be examined in order to 
categorize the recording unit) is the paragraph. The unit of enumera-
tion {quantification) is a score of one (1) each time a particular type 
of theme appears and is subsequently placed in the appropriate sub-
~ntegory. Neutral themes are coded on the same baais. 7 
EJOURCES EXPLORED: 
The material (content} analyzed in this study all came from the 
mailing and advertising campaigns of Louis E. Wolfson and Sewell Avery. 
It consists of personal letters to the stockholders, reprints of arti-
cles, reprints of newspaper advertisements, full page newspaper ads and 
various other pieces of literature including the l1ontgomer;Y vlard 1954 
Annual Report to the Stockholders. A full listing will be found in the 
bibliography. 
SAMPLING PROCEOORE: 
There was no need for a sampling procedure in this study • .All the 
material was obtainable from both sides, and to the best knowledge of 
the writer, it has all been included in the analysis. If one or two 
obscure pieces have been overlooked, familiarity with the greater body 
of the material induces great confidence that it would not significantly 
alter the results. 
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HYPBTHESES TESTED z 
As previously stated, a content analysis procedure cannot be for-
mulated without first formulating specific ~~othcses that are to be 
"tested" by the analysis. The categories of analysis are then designed 
so as to test the hypotheses. The following hypotheses have been tested 
in this ~ysis: 
vlOLFWARD 
1. That the pro-Wolfson part of the \Jolfward cam-
paign was designed to demonstrate VJolfsonts busi-
ness achievements to the vJard stockholders. 
2. That most of the above was accomplished by re-
current references to Wolfson's 11rescue plan" for 
Ward's. 
3. That the anti-Avery part of the Wolfward cam .. 
paign was designed primarily to demonstrate vlard' s 
poor record under the Avery management. 
4. That this was accomplished mostly by facts and 
figures demonstrating Wat'd's poor (competitive) 
record. 
NAN AGEI>TENT 
5. That the Avery-Management campaign was designed 
primarily to discredit Wolfson as a business manager. 
6. That the above was accomplished primarily by 
claims that ~Iolfson was a get-rich-quick speculator. 
7. That the Nanagement campaign was also largely an 
apologia for Ward's poor competitive record. 
B. That in order to accomplish the above 1 the man-
agement resorted strongly to quasi-emotional appeals. 
RELIABILITY: 
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Certainly a content analysis which was based on the work of one 
analyst could be subject ~o the most derogatory of criticism. For this 
reason1 most content analyses report the opinions of two (or more) per ... 
sons who have a.nalyzed the same material. This creates the problem of 
reporting on reliability. 
Reliability here merely refers to the extent to which there is 
agreement between the results of the two analysts. Although many con-
tent analyses are done without reporting on reliability, the writer felt 
that in an academic research paper there should be some measure of reli-
ability rep:>rted. For this reason, the follov-dng method was used. 
The second analyst received training from the writer until the lat-
ter was confident that the second analyst understood the categories and 
could work correctly with them. Then the second analyst repeated inde-
pendly the work of the writer, referred to as the "first analyst" in ap-
pendices B, C1 E, F, and G. vfuen the results were compared, the anal-
ysts made the following observations: 
There was a high degree of agreement in every cate-
gory. 
There were slight diserepancies a~ to the total 
number of themes categorized in both the Wolfson mate-
rial and the Management material. This indicated that 
there was a slight disagreE:ment betr1een the two 
analysts as to what constituted a theme. 
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Although we had already spent approXimately fifteen hours apiece 
in just analyzing the content individually, we decided that if we were 
to allow such a discrepancy, no matter how slight, it would drastically 
reduce the strength of any statement or conclusion drawn on this data. 
vle therefore resolved~ reEea~ ~ entire analrsi.2J. But before we . 
began, we redefined 11theme 11 until there was absolutely no doubt. 
This time the analysts worked together, paragraph by paragraph. 
The first analyst would mark down independently what he considered to 
be themes of a given paragraph and their proper sub-categories. He 
would then pass the document to the second analyst, and he would to 
the same. The results were then compared. About 80 per cent of the 
time there was complete agreement between the analysts, When there was 
disagreement as to whether or not a certain segment of writing consti-
tuted a theme, the matter was discussed until complete agreement was 
reached. Although we were able to obtain 100% agreement on defining 
every theme in the material, we could not get such high agreement on 
categorizing all of them. 
Reliability is reported as the percentage of agreement between the 
two analysts in categorizing the themes. The reader can easily see 
where the disagreements occurred by comparing, in appendix G the col-
umns marked first analyst and second analyst. He may also look at the 
results obtained from each piece of copy analyzed (appendices B, C and 
E, F) to get a more exact idea of where they occurred. 
The reliability figure is obtained by dividing the number of 
themes agreed on by the total number of themes categorized.8 
Wolfson Analysis }~gement Analysis 
.524 . .............. •••• •• • .agreed themes, •••••••••••••• , .••• , • .360 
---------------~-----------·~------------~-~------------------
.544 •••••••••••••••••••••• total themes•• ••••••••••••••••••••388 
96% approximately 92.1% approximately 
38 
It is interesting to note that a]hough the total number of themes 
found in analyzing the management material lvas considerably smaller 
than the total number found in analyzing the Wolfson material, there 
were twccty disagreements in both cases . 
Just one more point. The reader may question the figure "total 
themes categorized" as being larger than either .544 or 388. If he will 
refer to the note in appendix A he will see that when a theme was of 
such a nature that it was used either to refute an opposition accusa-
tion or to make a charge, it was scored twice. It was scored once as a 
charge or refutation, and once in the sub~category o£ its subject, It 
would not be accurate therefore to include the double scoring in the 
"total themes categorized"• The adjustment was made simply by sub-
tracting from tho grand total the number of themes found in the sub-
category columns containing charges and refutations. 
THE AVERY-MANAGEMENT CJU.1PAIGN: (Appendices A, B and C) 
In a management booklet titled, f.~.!.e~!l .. ~m' s Record, Th~ 
~e~. }ss~..:.. .!~}ng Mo~t.gome!z. _ _!Jard S_t~ckf:t~?.f-_d~_:~, the following statement 
was made: 
Mr. Louis E. Wolfson, in his effort to gain control 
of Montgomery Ward & Company, has made his own record 
of past business and financiaJ. operations the impor-
tant issue for 'Hard's stockholders to consider. 
His competency to manage Ward t s, were he to 
gain control, is the basic issue. illln THE ONLY YARD-
STICK FOR SUCH JUDGMENT IS HIS ~1..ANAGEHENT AND FIN- 9 ANCIAL DEALINGS WITH OOMPANIES HE PRESENTLY CONTROLS. 
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On the other hand, John A. Barr, now president and chairman of the 
Ward board of directors said: 
"The issues here are integrity of management and 
security of investment, principles rather than 
principaJ.s.ttlO 
Also speaking for the management, ex-vice president Edmund Krider made 
the statement that: 
"This vvolfson scheme is not legitimate in any sense 
of the word. It 1s purely a raid. He's smelled out 
money, and novr he wants to spend it. 11 11 
Finally, in supplying testimonial support for the Avery-management, the 
Businessmen's Conunittee for Seasoned Hanagement made the statement: 
Don't the Sewell .Averys of this country - THE TRU$ .. 
TEES OF AMERICAN BUSINESS AND WEALTH - rather than 
the corporate manipulators - deserve your support in 
this critical period? It is not orily a crisis for 
Montgomery Ward, but for the nation itself•l2 
The problem now is to see how well all of these, or any one of 
them, comes the closest to characterizing the major appeals of the man-
agement campaign. By answering this question we will be able to draw 
some conclusions as to what appeals the mfu~agement was most desirous 
of communicating to the stockholders. 
The first step is to restate the hypotheses concerning the man-
a.geJ'Q.ent campaign. They are : 
1. That the Avery-mruk~gement campaign was designed 
primarily to discredit Wolfson as a business manager. 
2, That the above lvas accomplished primarily by 
claims that Wolfson was a get-rich-quick spemllator, 
3. That the management campaign was also largely an 
apologia for Ward's poor competitive record under its 
present management. 
4. That in order to accomplish the above, the manage .. 
ment resorted to quasi-emotional appeals• 
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The second step is to examu1e the results of the content analysis 
in order to test these hypotheses. We can make the following observa-
tions from the analysis results: 
A, That ,t?e differences in percentage (as recorded ·-
by both analy~ts) between t he total pro-Avery themes 
and the total anti-Wolfson themes is not really great 
enough to conclude that the campaign was basically 
either 11pro 11 or 11anti'1• See appendices B and c. 
B. That the anti-Wolfson sub-categories containing 
those themes vlhich discredit his business record 
( anti-l,olfson themes 1 through 6) account for: 
89 • 2% of the total anti-'t'lolfson themes 
(1st analyst) 
89.6% of the total anti-Wolfson themes 
(2nd analyst) 
That these anti-Wolfson sub-categories form the 
largest category in the ent ire management analysis 
(with the exception of the neutral materii): 
26,0% lst analyst 
c. That Krider's accusation about Wolfson'o ulterior 
money motives (anti-Wolfson sub-category 1) was the 
type of theme accounting for the largest part of all 
the a.nti-Wolfson themes. 
23.8% lst analyst 24.1% 2nd analyst 
It may therefor~ be considered the most impor~ 
tant sub ... category of the 11anti-Wolfson business 
record" category. 
D. That the pro-Avery thomea which depleted him as 
protecting and providing a secure investment (pro• 
Avery, sub-category 2) constituted the largest block 
of themes in the pro•Avery business record category: 
29.0% 1st analyst 26.6% 2nd analyst 
E. That if we add to the total percentage of pro-
Avery themes depicting him as the "Trustee of .funerica.n 
Husiness and Wealth" (pro-Avery sub-category 5) the 
total percentage of themes depicting Wolfson as an 
attacker of everything Avery stands for (anti-
Wolfson sub-category 8) we obtain the following 
results: 
lst analzst 
i i · - ..,._ 
6.5.% ........... (pro-Avery, sub-cat 5) •••• 6.5% 
1.5% ••••••• (anti-Wolfson, sub-cat 8) ..... 1.5% 
a.o% a.o% 
F. That a quick look at appendices B and C reveals 
that a total of eight percent, had it been in one sin-
gle sub~category1 would have represented the largest 
single sub-category of themes (excluding the neutral 
material). We canclude1 therefore, that this combined 
emotional appeal was quite important in the management 
campaign. 
GENE~U. OJNCLUSIONS CONCERNING THE HYPOTHESES: 
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We can now make the following general observations concerning our 
hypotheses: 
The most important part of tho Avery-management campaign was that 
part designed to show that tvolfson 1 s past record of business and fin-
ancial operations made him basically incompetent to manage Ward's. And 
the most important single sub-category here is con~osed of these themes 
showing Wolfson's motives to be .i11.hercntly selfish and ultimately detri-
mental to Ward. The first and second ~otheses, then, seem to hold true. 
The second most :iJnportant part of the Avery-management campaign was 
an attempt to reinforce the record of the il..very management. But the 
most important sub-category here contains those themes rihich went to 
show how Avery represents and protects the security (soundness, safety1 
reliability, etc.) of the Ward investment. Thus our third hypothesis 
holds true, also. 
Of great importance in the category of pro-management emotional 
reir1orcement themes, is the sub-category of themes associating Avery 
with 11.l'unerican principles of sound business" and as one of the 11Trus-
/ 
' ,/ \ .· 
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accounts for roughly 22% of the total pro-Avery section. But when com-
bined with its complimentary anti-Wolfson sub-category (i.e, that Wolf-
son by attackipg Avery is attacking everything Avery stands for) the 
combination represents an essential part of the Avery campaign. There-
fore, we may safely assume the verity of the fourth hypothesis. 
PROBABLE REASONING BEHIND THE AVERY CAMPAIGN: 
In suggesting reasons for the design of the Avery-management cam-
paign, it is dangerous to do anything but make general assumptions on 
rather general facts. Searching too deep for reasons may only result 
:i.n very pretentious circumlocution,- We can, however 1 lay out a rather 
well-fitting suit of facts with which to clothe the management side of 
the proxy fight for !1ontgomery 11ard. 
First, we must realize that although the management side had the 
advantage of prestige, it can be shown that it also had the disadvan-
tage of having to remain rather decorus in designing and executing its 
campaign. It must be remembered that the opposition side was composed 
of Ward stockholders who just happened to side with the Wolfson commit-
tee this year. Management could take no chances on alienating them per-
manently • If management threw ttmud", it had to be sprinkled lightly 
rather than hurled in cakes. For this reason, the writer believes 
management stepped gingerly when making emotionally loaded accusations 
about Wolfson. When it did make charges this was mostly to punch more 
holes in vlollson' s past business and financial operations or in his 
plans for 11rebuilding'' Hontgomer-.r Ward. The only bit of anti-Wolfson 
campaigning that contradicts the above statement, and which seemed_ o'l.l,t, 
. -~ " ... 
of character with the rest of the campaign, was the accusation that 
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Wolfson allied himself with a Florida dog-track owner when he supported 
Fuller Warren for governor of Florida.13 
The management campaign seemed most intent on exposing Wolfson as 
corporate speculator whose past business record indicated unethical 
methods and clandestine :motives. The reasons !or this approach are 
obvious. Not too much was known about vlolfson before he opened up his 
campaign for Montgomery vJard. Although V·tall Street brokers, bankers and 
business men had undoubtedly heard of his exploits at Herrit-Chaptman 
& Scott, New York Shipbuilding, and \·lash.ington Transit, the general 
public - the writer included - had little if any knowledge of him., .And 
it is from this general public that ~rontgomery Hard draws the vast ma-
jority of its stockholders-. 
vlolf son therefore entered this campaign on the defensive. He had 
to prove hi.mself to the public • Hanagement 1vas apparently in·tent on 
keeping him on the defensive ~1 every way it could. Hence, it kept hit-
t:i,ng his business record. This was good strategy. 
To have hit Holfson personally, more than management did, might 
have caused a backfire. 'rhe American public seems to have a great deal 
of empathy for the young, ambitious underdog >'l'ho has pulled himself up 
by his frayed bootstraps~ and is nm·r ready to take on the big fight of 
his life. Holfson had something of this Horatio Alger aura about him-
self. Deprecating Wolfson personally m~ht have caused widespread re-
sentment among the stockholders, and the Holfson-empathy might have 
stolen many votes avlay from Avery. 
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In support of this contention we even find :that people who did per-
sonal or telephone solicitation were warned against m9king any state-
ments about Wolfson that might tend to antagonize a doubtful stock-
holder. They were advised never to "close the door completely behind 
them11 • 14 
The management strategy was to keep the positive emotional appeals 
on its own side, and merely by implication to let the negative emotion-
al appeals fall where they might on the opposition side. Avery was 
therefore represented as everything good, honest, industrious, sage and 
respectable in American business,. rThereas Wolfson, by implication, be-
came everything anti thetical to these symbols. vlhereas Avery was made 
to be the 11puritan11 of American business, a loader "tvho has the "guts" to 
stand up for his principles, 11one of the great business managers of our 
free enterprise system" and a sort of business genius, Wolfson simul-
taneously became a 11oorporate manipulator", a "raider" 1 a promisor of 
"pie in the sky" and a generally undesirable person, muGh less a possi-
ble Ward director.15 
But this is the kind of stuff that appeals to stockholders whose 
business knowledge is so shc."ll.low that they are likely to make up their 
minds emotionally and irrat:l.onally • For those lvho knew enough to be 
distrubed by comparatively small dividends when ~·Jard 1 s had been stock-
piling cash reserves to the extent of $6001 0001 000 there was another 
approach. The dormant r eserves became a symbol of American stability 
and security. It was a "nest-egg" for a rainy day, certainly a good 
idea as any "prudent fam.i.ly man knowsn ,.16 The retail merchandising 
business was painted as extremely unstable, more unstabte than most . 
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businesses. Cash reserves were theretorc needed constantly in case of 
emergency. Avery really was seeing to Ward's expansion possibilities, 
--
but in great moderation, mostly because present construction prices were 
all out of line with normality.16 The dependability of the .vJard annual 
dividend was highly praised, and frequent announcement was made of the 
fifty cent increase as of 1954.17 
Here again, there appeared to be a combination of surface scratch-
ing business principles with appeals to deep seated emotional predelec-
tions and antipathies. This was an important part of the campai gn too• 
Since Wolfson 1 s campaign streseed what several highly respected business 
writero and brokers considered t o be valid criticisms of the Avery man-
agement's record, Avery undoubtedly felt he owed them just a small bit 
of e3planation. But when he defended himself, he seemed consistently 
to strengthen his defenses with emotion-tinged rationalizations• 
One rather overworked element that servos as an example of the 
above, was management's reference to the "security" o! the Ward invest-
menJ. It was pointed out in various ways that the ivard investment has 
been, and will continue to be, one of the safest, soundest and most 
reliable investments of all publicly owned U.s. corporations.18 Divi-
dends, regardless of size, ar e still money in the pocket, and security -
regardless of its frequently stultifying effects - is still to many a 
pot of gold at the end of the rainbow. So Avery was able to make ex-
cellent use of this appeal. 
There were several factors that the Avery campaign either ignored, 
glossed over quickly or skillfully mitigated. Avery's age and the ad-
vanced ages of severaL directors somehmv averaged out to less than fifty 
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years. However, 42-year-old ex-president Edmund Krider and 47-year-old · 
John Barr became relatively youthful, energetic spokesmen for the ma.n-
19 
agement team. Avery's previous labor difficulties went unmentioned. 
His gloom and doom depret1Sion philosophy became "sitting on the booms 
to prevent bustsn. 
THE WOLFSON CAHPAIGN: (Appendices D, E and F) 
Unlike the mano.gement campaign, there seemed to be more general 
agreement as to the bus is of the Wolfward campaign. David Charnay 1 
frequently playing the dual role of public relations man and chief 
Wolfson spokesman, had the following to say: 
¥~. Wolfson stands on his record, his integrity, his 
performance. His approach is predicated in a firm 
belief in the American economy as opposed to hitching 
his future to a depression as has the management of 
l1ontgomery Ward. 20 
In a letter addressed to "my dear fellow shareholders", Wolfson had 
this to say: 
If I were to meet you personally, as indeed I hopo to 
do, I think I would describe our program for Montgomery 
Ward quite simply as based on confidence and optimism 
-- confidence in the possibility of great grO\vth for 
l1ontgomery Ward and optimism a.s to the strength and 
soundness of Jlmerican economic future.21 
In general, these represent the ways in vlhich t.he Wolfson side de-
picted the conflict. It was "gloom and doom" vs. "progressive confident 
management"• Now let's turn to the analysis and see what the Wolfson 
campaign was really based on .. . 
Again, we must make the analysis in terms of the hypotheses to be 
tested by the analysis categories. The hypotheses are as follows: 
1. That the pro-Wolfson part of Wolfward campaign was 
primarily designed to demonstrate VJ"olfson IS bUSineSS 
achievements and abilities to the Ward stockholders 
2. That most of the above was accomplished by re-
currellllt references to Wolfson's "rescue plan" for Ward's 
3. That the anti-Avery part of the Wolfward campaign 
-vras designed ,primarily to demonstrate \vard' s poor re- . 
cord under the Avery management 
4. That this was accomplished mostly by facts and fi-
gures demonstrating Ward's poor (competitive) record 
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By studying Appendices E and F we make the following observations: 
A. That the total percentages of pro-Wolfson and anti-
Avery categories are too similar to determine safely 
whether the Uolfson campaign was dominantly pro-Wolfson 
or anti-Avexy 
B. That · the pro_.Wolfson category consisting of those 
themes which reinforce Wolfson's business record (pro-
Wolfson sub-categories 1-6) .consist of: 
95.2% of all the pro-Wolfson themes . 
(1st analyst) 
95.5% of all the pro-Wolfson themes 
(2nd analyst) · 
That these sub-categories form one of the two largest 
categories found in the entire Wolfson analysis 
34% of total - 1st analyst 
33.0% of total .. 2nd analyst 
C. That in the above category, the sub-category 
accounting by far for the greatest number of all pro-
Wolfson themes is the one which includes all themes 
describing his plans for 1rlards. That this is also i(he 
largest sub-category in the entire pro-Wolfson part of 
the campaign 
44.0% 1st analyst 
45.0% 2nd analyst 
D. That themes concerning Wolfson's confidence, op-
timism, progressiveness and belief in the growth of 
American business accounted for very little of the pro-
\-folfson part of the campaign 
3.6% 1st analyst 
3.7% 2nd analyst 
E. That even if the total percent of anti-Avery 
themes depicting Avery as representing gloom and 
doom, (reaction and as having no faith in American 
business progress, etc.) is added to the total per-
cent of the themes depicting Holfson as in D above, 
the result is a relatively small part of the entire 
campaign 
l.J% plus .9~ equals 2.2%, 1st analyst 
1.3% plus .9% equals 2.2%, 2nd analyst 
F. That the largest anti-Avery category is that 
which includes all themes deprecating the business 




95.0% of the total anti-Avery themes, 1st analyst 
95.8% of the total anti-Avery themes, 2nd analyst 
G. That the largest single anti-Avery sub-category 
(which also appears in the a~ve /F/ category) is the 
one consisting of those themes (facts and figures) 
used to demonstrate Ward 's poor competitive perfor-
mance generally under the Avery management (sub-
category 2) 
42.5% of total anti-Avery themes, 1st analyst 
44.5% of total anti-Avery themes, 2nd analyst. 
GENERAL OONCLUSIONS CONCERNING THE HYPOTHESES: 
5o 
We find, therefore, that based on THE FREQUENCY OF OCCURRENCE OF 
THE THEMES ANf~YZED, all four hypotheses hold true. Wolfson's cam-
paign did attempt to demonstrate his own business abilities and achieve-
ments to ·tne stockholders in his wri tte11 campaign. In particular, he 
placed strong emphasis on his plans for Wards. · 
Secondly, his campaign did atten~t to discredit the ~very manage-
ment. This was achieved mostly by presentation of themes (with facts 
and figures) demonstrating that \rJard had built up a poor record under 
the Avery management, and that Ward 's had also made a poor competitive 
showing. 
It is rather obvious that Charnay and Wolfson were somewhat off 
base when .they characterized their basic c~~paign appeals . One might 
say that in a broad philosophical way they both hit important points, 
if not the major ones. But the purpose of content ann.lysis is to reach 
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behind broad sweeping philosophical statements and find out what they 
mean. It seems likely then that when VJolfson claimed the basis for his 
program lay in "confidence and optimism in the possibility of .great 
growth for !11ontgomery w·nrd and optimism as to the strength and sou..r1dness 
of .America's economic future", 22 he -vms philosophically referring to 
something else. According to the results of this analysis, that some-
thing else could only have been his plans for Ward, since these account 
for the greatest part of his campaign. For it would make more sense if 
he had merely said that tho basis of his program lies in his confidence 
and optimism that his plans for Ward will work, and that since every 
other enterprise in J\merica seems to be mru(ing money on somewhat the same 
plana, there is no reason why Montgomery 1vard shouldn't be able to do it 
also. 
From which it should follow naturally that the reason he believes 
Ward is not making money and growing, is that tho present management 
does not seem to agree with a growth .. ma.ke money plan. Therefore, the 
second most important part of the campaign vms centered around telling 
the stockholders how the present management policy prevents this growth. 
Or, to return to the language of proxy- fight philosophy, that the gloom 
and doom policy doesn't believe in a dyn~1ic American economy. 
PROBABLE REiiSONING BEHIND THE '\rJOLFSON C.tlMP1UGN: 
In order to understand the reasoning behind the Holfson campaign, 
it is first necessary to have some understanding of what '\rlolfson was up 
against when he undertook to unseat the Avery management. The Ward 
stock is distributed roughly in the follmving manner: 23 
A-. There are about 621000 individuals who own roughly 
3,500,000 shares. This amounts to about 52 shares per 
person. 
B. There are about 4,800 institutions, banks, brokers 
and trust funds who hold roughly J,ooo,ooo shares . 
The meaning of these figures is plain. To quote from Business 
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~ magazine, "Even if vJ'olfson can hold the good backing that he clairns 
among individual stockholders (he claimed backing of over l,ooo,ooo 
shares), he vrill have to make big inroads into the institutional group 
to win control. 1124 In fact, if Wolfson had taken any warning from the 
results of the New York Central proxy fight, he needed the Wall Street 
backing a great deal more than he needed the backing of the trAunt 
Janes." 
Paradoxically enough, Robert Young's vituperative admonitions to 
the Wall Street crowd didntt seem to alienate their votes when he needed 
them. Young lost the popular vote for the Central, but he got strong 
backing from the vJall Street interests • 25 A look at the final tally 
shows that it was the largest bank and broker holdings that swung the 
election to Young. Did \-Jolfson face a similar situation? Did he have 
to cater more to the all-pov1erful interests of the large holders than 
to the smaller ones? 
The record says he did. And the r ecord also says that it was ob-
viously his failure to influence this group favorably that hurt him 
most. For like Young, l'iolfson also failed to get strong suppo:rt fl"om 
the small stockholders. But mllike Young , who carried the professional 
financial interests on his side and was therefor e able to win vJ'ith a 
very s~ight plurality, Wolfson was r elatively ostracized by the finan-
cial interests, and lost.26 
.53 
Having taken notice of Wolfson's tenuous backing problem, we po~ 
.. · ·' have avery probable reason to explain two features..-uf the Wolfso* cam-
1 . 
paign brought out in the analysis. First, there ·is the fact that when-
ever vJolfson 1 s campaign turned from extoling his·· own virtues to .depre-
cating the record of the Avery management, there were ample facts and 
figures to support his statements. It was an attempt at business ob-
jectivity; perhaps the kind of stuff that would inspire an interested 
/ 
~oker or banker to look deeper into the situation for more meaty aAd 
technical reasoning, It was also the kind of campaign appeal that might 
tend to make dividend .. starved stockholders tell their lbroker agents to 
vote the stock for Wolfson. 
Secondly, there was the fact that both Wolfson and Charnay con~ 
sistently promised that no .attack would 1b:e made against Sewell Avery 
personally. The analysi s shows that these promises were generally 
borne out. There were a few charges that Avery had pushed some of his 
business operations to the very fringes of ethical conduct, but essen• 
tially nothing that would be sure to antagonize brokers or bankers who 
might have been personally friendly to Avery - and yet uho still might 
think of Wolfson as a better business friend for Warde 
In short, Holfson needed a campaign that would appeal both to the 
large stockholders and the small ones, But among the former 1 ·wolfs on 
had to take special pains to attract the Wall Street professionals •. 
And he had to take equa.D.y great pains not .alienate them. 
An over ... all look at the vlolfson situation will give us another 
reason for his promoting a strong Wolfson campaign. As stated in ~he 
analysis of the Avery campaign, 1blfson had the difficult task of prov-
: . . .. 
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ing himself to a naive audience, According to David Charnay, news of 
Wolfson's proxy fight plans broke prematurely when Leslie Gould, finan-
cial editor of the New York Journal American, published it on August 20~ 
1954. This caught the Wolfson public relations campaign short by about 
six or eight weeks,27 There was no time slowly and carefully to pre-
sent Wolfson to the public as an astute young business tycoon. What-
ever good impression Wolfson was to make on the Ward stockholders now 
had to be done strictly on a dollar and cents basis • . 
This is probably why Wolfson's campaign stressed his Rescue Plan 
for Wards so much, Wolfson had merely to keep pointing out that the 
Avery management was apparently satisfied with the status quo, that it 
did not seem to mind Ward's poor competitive position and that it ob-
viously had no plan for doing anything about it. ~folfson, on the other 
hand, had a plan, The more often he reiterated his plan, the more the 
point was driven home that the Avery management had none. By studying 
the analysis, we can see that the management apparentl y had little con• 
structive ammunition with vlhich to fight off this type of attack. · 1-Jhere-
as Wolfson t s plans accounted for about 4.5>~ of the total pro..;Wolfson 
themesJ the management's plans only accounted for about 12% of their 
total pro-management themes. But if we add to these themes the total 
number of themes which served to denounce Wolfson's plans as "pie in the 
sky", (anti-Wolfson Sub-category 2) it still amounts to about 9.5% of 
the total management campaign, a rather sizable section. 
In this respect then, Wolfson probably created an advantage for 
himself, For if he was able to convince stockholders that there really 
was plenty to complain about in the way Ward was being run, he had his 
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follow-up blow cocked and ready. That is, he had a plan. Management, 
however, was pretty well caught without a plan, and this was a serious 
disadvantage. 
On the other hand, Wolfson was at a disadvantage when it came to 
defending h~nself against management's barbed accusations about his 
past business operations. Wolfson's campaign included 37 direct refu-
tations to answer management's 14 charges, whereas management's cam-
paign included only one direct refutation to counter Wolfson's 20 
charges. Avery had themvantage of prestige, and perhaps did not think 
it too necessary to reply to every L~olfson question. But violfson appar-
ently felt that it would be more damaging to his cause if he let the 
Avery charges go urmns\vered than if he gave the stockholders a guided 
tour of his side of the mountain. 
This 1 incidentally, makes good public relations sense. It is un-
fortunate that we have no way of appraising the stockholders' reaction 
to this aspect of each campaign. 
There is just ono final appeal to be discussed. That is the one 
which both sides seemed to attach as a sort of rider to all of the cate-
gories. Wolfson kept referring to it as corporate democracy. Wolfson 
liked to represent himsC:lf as a great corporate democrat, \vhcreas he 
tried to convince the stockholders that Avery was an old corporate auto-
crat. If we make a heroic attempt at scraping the symbolic barnacles 
off both campaigns, the issue of corporate demo cracy seems to evolve 
into viho was more sincerely representative of the interests of tho stock-
holders. And the two approaches Qre really quito interesting. 
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Wolfson's approach was square"knotted in with his legal victory 
over the Avery-instituted stagger system. Immediately after his case 
was upheld by the Illinois Supreme Court, he sent out an oversized post-
nlgram notifying all stockholders that now, for the first time, they 
could exercise their democratic rights by voting the victors into 
office. 28 
Avery's campaign seemed to favor the paternalistic approach. Avery 
was the "trustee of American Business and Wealth 11 , a "balance wheel 11 who 
had unselfishly taken on a job to 11bring about a better life in America11 • 29 
Since it was rather common knowledge by this time that Avery wanted 
nothing but 11yes-men11 around hjlll, it would have been somewhat inane for 
the management to represent him as even tolerating democratic corporate 
decision making. The public relations approach was rather to paint 
Avery as a sort of modern benevolent despot whose business insights >-Jere 
i nfallible, and who l'otained his position of chairman by virtue of the 
fact that he represented everything that was good and noble in American 
business. 
~Jas this a good approach? ~i e cant t r eally say • However, even 
though management won the pro~ fight, Sewell Avery no longer sits on 
the throne. 
It would be easy at this point to continue to speculate on another 
dozen points. Certainly, all of tho information from the content 
analysis has not been touched on. However, the major points have been 
made, and sufficient i nstruction in the us e of the analysis has been 
included to enable anyone to do his own speculating. There is just 
one point to remember however, and it was mentioned at the beginn:ing 
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of this section. This analysis was done only on the written campaign 
material. Although one may be reasonably certain that the written cam-
paign of each side reflects exactly the same ~ppeals, and to somewhat 
the same extent as the other methods of solicitation, scientific metho-
dology admonishes us to be careful. 
All conclusions made on the basis of this content analysis can 
r efer only to the material that \las analyzed! One cannot positively 
conclude that all of the speeches, coffee cup conferences, telephone 
calls and house visits were desig~1ed to propound the same appeals. We 
can only conjecture that they did. 
CHAPTER I\T 
'l'HJ<.: B11S I C APPEALS !?OUND n,r 'rl-IT~ HQIIT'I'GOivJERY ~lARD 
PROXY CQli;T~S'l' CJU1Jl AI GN A.R.b SEEN TO OCG'UR TilT 
ThO OTBER RECENT PROXY COFTE.ST CJU~PAIGN.S 
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THE APPEALS AND THE OTHER PROXY FIGHTS: 
To show that there is a strong similarity between the appeals in 
the Montgomery ward proxy fight and those used in the proxy fights for 
the New York Central Railroad and the New Haven Railroad, this paper 
now will present examples from each. Having selected the major appeals 
in the Mont.gomcry ~l o.t'd t'ight. the reodur will now observe that these 
appeals were unique to Ward onlyin the sense that the physical charac• 
teristics of this corporation are different from those of the rail-
roads. But the appeals to the stockholders, the basic public relations 
approaches, were similar to those of the other proxy fights. 
When making these comparisons, there is one very important. thing 
to bear in mind. No statement is made in this paper as to the relative 
importance of these various appeals which appear in the New York Cen-
tral and New Haven Railroad proxy fights. It should also be remembered 
at this point that the only measure of their relative importance in the 
Montgomery Ward proxy fight is based on the frequency of appearance of 
certain themes which the content analysis has shown to formulate these 
appeals. 
A content analysis has not been done on the other two proxy f ights., 
although this is certainly suggested as necessary and interesting re-
search. However, enough research was done on these two campaigns so 
that the writer is more than reasonably confident that the examples 
included express the designated appeals. They are also the most ob~ 
vious ones available. 
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It must also be remembered that this paper has not made any state-
ments as to the ef!ect of any of the appeals on the stockholders, It 
T'l"'e. has merely suggested probabla reasons for the use of a.a appeals, 
There is a world of difference. No content analysis of this sort can 
reveal effects. Effects can only be measured by some form of attitude-
survey technique, again suggested as necess~ and interesting re-
search. 
THE MANAGEMENT CAMPAIGNS 
A, Management tries to show that the insurgent's past 
business record makes him incompetent or undesirable to 
take over this corporation, 
Montgo~erz Ward E~les: 
11A careful study of Mr. \volfson • s business record, 
together with the fact he made his bid for control 
so soon after purchase of his stock, leads to the 
inevitable conclusion that his campaign is simply 
a financial venture for the benefit of his backers 
and himself. We are convinced that the security 
of investment Which you now have would be destroyed 
if he were placed in control."l 
"All four of ~~. WOlfson's major companies had a 
slump in earnings during 1954 under 1953. The 
Jacksonville, Illinois plant of Nesco, manufact,l!'ers 
of kitchenware, was closed down early in 1955,tt2 
New York Central Examples: 
"Mr. Young's record on the Chesapeake and Ohio 
Railroad has demonstrated that control by him of 
the New York Central would be harmful to the 
property if the innovations attempted on the C & 0 -
and which proved to be failures - were to be tried 
on the New York Central •••• The danger of bank-
ruptcy would arise.tt3 
"The Chesapeake is a good strong coal-carrying 
railroad and was long before it came under ~~. 
Young's control, He tried to eJ..."Pand its passen-
ger operations, and that mistake re~ulted in heavy 
losses to the Chesapeake and Ohio.tt4 
New Haven Railroad Example: 
In a letter sent to all stockholders, Morgan B. 
Brainard, ex-chairman of the New Haven Board and 
Frederick c. Dumaine, Jr., ex-president, declared 
that the Interstate Commerce Commission had found 
glaring instances of mis-management "of the Nor-
folk Southern Railroad by a group headed by Mr. 
McGinnis." 
The letter quoted the report o£ the F.c.c. as 
showing that in less than five years, McGinnis had 
taken out $167,229 in salaries, bonuses and fees 
from the railroad and subsidiary companies, and 
$477,055 for exp0nses. Also, that three of McGin-
nis' associates had drawn ~500j000 more in salaries, 
fees, bonuses, as well as huge sums for expenses.5 
B. Management reinforces its own position as a protector of 
a sound investment, and as representing good solid American 
business citizenry, 
t:.tontsoms:x )lord ~loa; 
"The corporation has a net worth of over $600 mil-
lion, including 1300 million in cash. There is no 
debt of any kind, This financial strength gives 
the stockholders a security of investment matched 
by few companies.n6 
11For America to be great, these stabilizers••••• 
The Sewell Avery! - must continue to play an act-
ive part in .Amoricml life. The important 'balancer 
wheels in our nation rest among our seasoned coun-
selors in business, finance, in education, in poli-
tics, and in every form of .American lifo. Each day 
we need their wisdom and experience to help us go 
on as a nation,n7 
New York Central Examples: 
"President Whit~rs review of his first full year 
shows revenue increases three times the average for 
nation's railroads ••• ,.many new operating economies 
•••• , earning up from ~P3 • 83 to ~5. 27 per share • ••• • 
dividends doubled. 118 
"Since we have a contest on our hands we'll con-
duct it in a bare-fisted manner, with deconcy and 
honor, and in such a way as to retain our self-
respect and that of our friends, (sic.) yes, but 
there will be no holding back on ~ other grounds. 
This could be the beginning of a technique in 
which we find an astute trader with a certain popu-
lar appeal moving in on professional management of 
big firms. American business right now has the 
most widespread ownership that it's ever had in 
history, and that's a fine, democratic thing. It 
would be, to say the least, unfortunate if this 
widespread ownership were allowed to be used as a 
tool by demagogues. We're not ONLY FIGHTING TO 
KEEP CONTROL OF THE CENTRAL., WE•RE WLFILLING AN 
OVER-ALL RESPONSIBU.ITY TO AMERICAN SUSINESs.u9 
New Haven Railroad Examples: 
w ,e. 
Frederick Dumai.ne~. e~-president of the ~ew Haven. 
RaUroad made .frequent statements that he h&Q. 
replaced old railroad stat:l.ons.,. b"P.o:Ut a $~Q mil"l'l 
lion market in ~oston•s South Station atCQI.. w~ch 
brought $200 million a.nn~al.q .ip, hauling contracts 
to the New Haven RailrG>a4; ~··that ·undel" his man• 
agement the railroad has paf<i crt ba~k pre.fened 
stock dividends of $26.00. per shate.,_10 
11 I think this type ot fellow (McGinnis) and back~ 
ground is bad for any company• The New Haven 
should have a sound, conservative New mngland 
management. nll 
THE INSURGENT MANAGEMENT CAMPAIGN: 
A. The insurgents try to prove to the stockholders that their 
past business records qualify them for the new job with this 
corporation. 
Montgomery Ward ExamEles: 
11 I have heard much of the worst that could be 
said about him - almost none of it substantiated. 
A lot of it boils down to resentment at the mani-
pulations by which he has acquired control of his 
present enterprises. On examination, these methods 
. 61 
differ little from those of many financiers con-
trolling some of today's great companies. 
11But from all the material dug up, from all 
the study and research, we can only conclude that 
stockholders will benefit more from a Wolfson 
victory than from a continuation of the Avery 
management.nl2 
"The dividend :r-et urns and capital appreciation 
consistently accruing to his (Wolfson's stock-
holders have undeniably been of the very best •••• 
Analysis of the three comp~ies (Merritt-Chapman 
& Scott, Capital Transit and New York Shipbuilding} 
indicates that in each case the growth and im-
proved earnings picture justify the rise in share 
value.nl3 
New York Central Examples: 
In an ad in the Wall Stt'eet Journal, Robert 
Young shows how, when he and Allan P. Kirby were 
at the helm of the Allegheny Holding Company, 
they were able to raise tho value of tho secu-
rities and pay greater dividends to the stock-
holders.l4 
New Haven Railroad Examplesa 
------------~---~~-
According to John P. Rutherford, a member of the 
old New Haven Board of Directors, t he records of 
the Norfolk and Southern Railroad showed "beyond 
proadventure the complete revitalization of one 
of the country's class railroads under the man-
agement of Patrick McGinnis. 
"This revitalization was evidenced in vast 
improvements of the physical properties, far 
reaching dioselization of tractive equipment, 
phenomenal recovery in earning power, sharp re-
duction in indebtedness and interest charges, the 
placement of the common stock on a liberal and 
a regular dividend basis, 1115 
The insurgent management committee lays great stress on its plans. 
MontgomeEr Ward ~~ples: 
Montgomery Ward can be rebuilt: 
~.~if it gets progressive manngement 
••• if its financial policies are revamped 
••• if its merchandising methods are brought up 
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to date 
••• if its personnel policies are modernized 
Here is a program for Montgomery Ward. Match 
it against the present management's policies 
which we consider archaic and detrimental to 
the company and its employees,l6 
New York Central E~les: 
Young stressed his plans· to "vigorously address 
ourselves to the passenger department which last 
year lost more than 50 million dolla.r·s • n He also 
had plans to rebuild some of the Central's old 
passenger terminalso He promised that he would 
be able to pay a dividend of from $7-10 a share 
and to raise the value of the Central stock to 
over $loo.l7 
!ew Haven Railroad Examples: 
MeGinnis promised to pay off remaining $4.00 per 
share of preferred stock, and start paying divi-
dends on New Haven 1s 525,789 shares of common 
stock. He also planned for better commuter ser-
vice and a three hour Boston to New York trip,lB 
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The insurgent management tries to show to the stockholder that the com-
panyts achievements are either poor, below those of its competitors, 
or both, and that the fault lies with the incumbent management. 
Morigomery Ward Exampl;_e,s: 
110ther chain stores and mail order houses have 
been building stores, opening new markets, and 
expanding at a record rate, Montgaunery Ward has 
net kept pace. ' Quite the contrary, the company 
has been retrenc~g ••• it has closed stores 1 re-
duced its plant investment, let its cash lie idle, 
11That 1s not progress. Tbat 1s depression thinking. 
It has resulted in failure to participate in the 
biggest retail sales boom in history, It has been 
apparent iij lost sales and earnings, lost oppor-
tunities for expansion, lost executive talent~ 
These have been The Lost Years of Montgomery 
Ward,u 
11 Can we expect to see any improvement? No - we see 
no reason to think so under the present management 
whi.ch st ressed in a recent newspaper article that 
its policies have not been changed. 11 
From Let's Rebuild Montgomery Ward. 19 
New York Central Example~: 
"Of the 19 largest railways in the Ee.stern Dis-
trict, the Pocahontas and Southern Regions as 
selected and tabulated by the Bureau of Trans-
portation Statistics of the ICC, the New York 
Central, with one exception, ranked the poorest 
in 1952 operating ratio (expenses to revenues) 
for freight service." 
11Virtually all departments of the railroad have 
been brought by tho present (J.P . Morgan} board 
to levels among the lowest in operation efficiency. 
The Central has to be cleaned up before she can 
marry.u20 
New Haven Examples: 
11 In railroading, as in other businesses, the 
test of management is profit, and the present 
management of the New Haven has failed inherently 
to meet this basic test. 11 
}1cGinnis. 21 
McGinnis also prepared tables showing that the 
New Raven's operating ratlo compared unfavorably. 
with that of the Penns21vania Railroad and New 
York Central Railroad. 2 
The insurgent management takes up the 11 crusade 11 to return corporate 
democracy etc. to tho stockholders., 
~ontgomerr Ward Examples: 
11Thanks to the court action instituted by Louis . 
E. Wolfson on February 1, 19551 the so-called 
stagger system for election of director~ was held 
to be unconstitutional, and stockholders, who arc 
the owners of the company, will have the right to 
vote a:t one election for the ontirc nina .. rnember 
board for the first time since the Avery manage-
ment deprived them of it ten years ago. By a 
decision of the courts of Illinois, your right 
to change the management of your company in a 
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single year has been restored to you at last, 
despite virogous opposition by Avery me.nagement.n23 
New York Central Examples: 
"Just ask yoliD.rself why the four bankers on the 
present board, together owning only 4.50 shares 
of Central, are so detei'!IIdned to hang on to your 
company. Is it not because of the substantial 
benefits which have accrued to their four banks 
through cash deposits, trusteeships and count~ 
less other ways? 
11The directors and officers: of these four banks 
interlock with 50 other industrial companies and 
14·other railroads having assets of more than 
$107 billion. How much of the undivided loyalty 
·of these four men do you think your Central enjoys?n24 
"Because of my concern over the concentration o£ 
control in the hands of a few, I have been hopeful 
that some person or group of persons would break 
up the control of the Morgan, Kuhn, Loeb and Mellon 
interests which have long dominated our railroads• 
1[t was therefore a source of personal gratification 
to me to read that Mr. Robert R. Young was under-
taking this task by seeking control of the New York 
Central. I think it is high time that the NoY.c, 
be removed from the control of the banking group 
and be returned to control by its stockholders.n2$ 
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CONCUJSIONS AND REOOMMENDATIONSc 
The conclusions and recommendations have been combined in such a 
way as to formulate a plan by which management can antic1pate proxy 
fight arguments. Of course, the same information could be used by an 
opposition committee to formulate a pr~ fight attack, but the fact 
is that this last section has been so designed so as to have as little 
to do with the author's predispositions or prejudices as possible. In 
fact, he isn't oven a shareholder of any corporation. Only in the in· 
terest of brevity, therefore, is a management plan presented. But the 
other can be left to the reader's imagination. 
Needless to say, the most importantthing is t o eradicate the con-
ditions which lead to proxy fights, But this involves procedures much 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
The paper does, however, give insight into what a management group 
will have to face from an opposition group if management does not take 
measures to prevent a proxy fight. The arguments used in the proxy 
fights described here will be used again. They have been used because 
they proved most effective in revealing to the stockholders the short-
comings of their corporation under its present management. Since I 
have: already mentioned some of these shortcomings that tend to make 
a company ripe for a proxy fight, let us repeat them and start there 
to .formulate the plan for a 11pre-proxy fight campaign". 
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STEP I LOOK FOR THE PROXY FIGHT SYNDROME 
A management should immediately become wary of its safety if the 




Scattered stockholders who seldom hear 
anything from management 
Directors holding only small blocks of shares 
Many stockholders, of whom large numbers hold 
only small blocks of stock 
Stock selling at well below its book value 
Large liquid assets 
A tendency for few stockholders to bother voting 
Price of stock low so that speculators can pick it 
up cheaply on the various exchanges 
Company's key directors over 70 years old 
There is also the questi on of whether or not a company is more sus-
ceptible if it uses cumulative votD1g in electing its directors. Pro-
feasor Chatles M. Williams of the Harvard Business School has studied 
this question, and says thnt proxy contests for directorships are only 
somewhat more frequent in corporations using cumulative voting. The 
difference is not such that cumulative voting can be definitely said 
to be a predisposing factor.2 
STEP 2 LOOK FOR THE UNDERLYING RATIONALIZATION 
If as a result of the above mentioned investigation a management 
believes its company susceptible to a proxy fight, it should re-examine 
the corporation to discover what factors an opposition group might be 
likely to select as' an underlying rationalization for a campaign. Here 
again there are guides for management to follow. Professor Williams 
has discovered that all of the proxy fights he studied fell into one 
of the following case types:.3 
1. Cases growing out of conspicuous management or -.1 
board Ailu:re 
Cases grounded in conflicts of important business 
interests between stockholders, or between stock-
holders and management 
.3. Cases in which stockholders became convinced on rather 
general grounds that the Board of Directors was unrep-
resentative of and generally insensitive to stockholder 
interests 
4. Clashes of strong personalities 
$.. Fights for control of a corporation in which represen-
tation through cumulative voting was an intermediate 
objective in the struggle for control 
6. Cases of anglers, opposition leaders who appeared to 
seek board memberships for selfish purposes 
STEP .3 SECURE COMPETENT PUBLIC RELATIONS COUNSEL 
A management which discovers that its corporation could provide 
one or more of these reasons to an opposition group (which is also 
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characterized by the factors listed in Step 1) should begin to consi-
der seriously that it is over-ripe for a proxy fight. Its next step 
(3) is to secure the help of experienced public relations counsel, and 
provide counsel with all the information thus far obtained in Steps 1 
and 2,. The remaining steps become the work of the public relations 
practitioners. 
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STEP 4 COMPANY FACT-FINDING 
On the basis of the information presentou in this paper1 a manage-
ment can expect the opposition group generally to outline its (1vritten) 
anti-management campaign in the following way: 
A. A great deal of it will be devoted to showing 
stockholders 1 by means of valid statistics etc. 1 that 
the company's achievements are COMPETITIVELY POOR1 
and that the fault lies with the present management. 
B. The opposition will try to show that the present 
board is general~unreprescntative of the stock• 
holders' interests. 
c. The opposition group will try to point out that 
the present management has no plan f~r curing what the 
opposition claims ails the company. 
Step 4 should consist of management 1 s collecting the same series of 
fact and fiction that an opposition group would be likely to use to exe-
cute arguments A, B and C above. This information will be put to use 
in Step 6. 
STEP 5 STOCKHOLDER RESEARCH 
Step 5 should be entitled1 Anticipating The Pro-opposition Group's 
Self-Reinforcement Campaign Appeals. But this is a very difficult thing 
to do. You cannot really anticipate a campaign that will come from an 
unknown source, You cannot, under ordinary circumstances, tell in ad-
vance who the leaders of this opposition group will be. And since we 
found in the Montgomery Ward campaign that the largest part of the 
"pro-opposition" group campaign was dedicated to extoling the past 
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business record of the opposition group's key figures, management must 
operate blindly here in the preliminary period. 
It can, however, keep itself periodically well informed as to the 
ownership of the corporationts stock. It should know just how many 
stockholders the corporation has, along with some sort of personal data 
record on each permanent stockholder, If the stock has high speculative 
value and changes hands rapidly, the management should solicit the ad-
vice of brokers as to what type of people seem to be interested in the 
stock. Over a period of time a general pattern can be formulated, ~ 
sudden change in the pattern might be interpreted as an indicator of 
trouble. 
Since the opposition group will have to "sell" its campaign to the 
stockholders, the management should institute a continuous program of 
surveying stockholder opinion to find out what they would be likely to 
"buy"• Just asking the stockholders to air their grievances about 
everything from dividends to advertising will act as a sort of cathar-
sis for those who are chronically resentful of strong management domi• 
nation, But it will also give management a good idea as to where the 
stockholders would welcome a change. For it is this "welcome change" 
that is likely to be adopted by an opposition group as the root of its 
plans for improvement. 
In essence, Step 5 amounts to a continuous program of research, 
With the information derived from Step 2, plus that from the suggested 
survey research in Step 5, management should be pretty well able to pre. 
diet what type of a "crusade" it will have to meet. And from the intro .. 
spection suggested in Stop 1, management should be able to estimate its 
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degree of vulnerability. But Step 5 is probably the most important of 
all• 
STEP 6 FORMULATING THE PRE .. PROXY FIGHT PLAN 
It is now time for the public relations counsel to plan management's 
Pre-Proxy Fight Campaign• We found by analyzing the Montgomery Ward 
proxy fight that the management used a great deal of its written cam-
paign material to reinforce its own record of achievements, But we 
also found that management generally fell down when it came to pre-
senting a plan to show the stockholders that management really was in• 
terested in improving the company and eventually paying greater divi-
dends etc. In a pre-proxy fight campaign, it is imperative to present 
such a plan. 
Such a plan would have a dual effect. First, it would prove man-
agement's foresightedness to the stockholders. Secondly, and more im-
portant, it would tend to mitigate the shock effect of an opposition 
groupta plan. When the opposition grou p presents its plan during the 
during the course of a proxy fight, it may well be the first time that 
most of the stockholders become aware of their company's possibilities. 
Naturally they are impressed, and the opposition group has gained an 
~dvantage. The proposals may be practical and feasible 1 or they may 
be "pie in the sky11 , but they capture a brilliant halo of dynamism and 
aggressiveness for their side, and magically fasten it where it can 
blind the stockholders. 
If, over a period of time, the management can report the progress 
of its plan to the stockholders, the effect of an opposition group•s 
proxy fight promises can be well mitigated. But, if the analysis holds 
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true, management will come out in second place in this phase of the 
campaign if it waits for the proxy fight before announcing its plans. 
We also found from the analysis that whereas the opposition group 
was able to confuse and da1~e the stockholders with statistics proving 
the company's poor competitive performance, management could only de-
fend itself with arguments that a safe, sound, reliable investment is 
preferable to the dangers inherent in speculative expansions and profit 
hungry schemes, Management may really have the sounder business lo~c 
on its side, but such logic may defy the understanding of anyone but 
astute executives, economists, and professional financiers. 
Over a period of time, however, in a pre-pro~ fight campaign, it 
may be possible to present the same embarassing statistics . showing the 
company's poor competitive standing, but to turn them to advantage. 
Although company X may not be doing as well as company z, it may be 
doing much better than company A, B and c. It may also be possible to 
present these 11 embarassing 11 facts as expected but temporary conditions 
in a company ~oveloprnont plan which calls for immediate moderation. In 
short, it is a matter of beating an opposition group to the punch by 
anticipating its unfavorable arguments, and turning the same material 
to the company's advantage before the proxy fight ever comes about, 
There is just one more suggestion to Step 6, The analysis showed 
us that in every case, the management tried to represent itself as al-
lied with or synonomous with the good things in American business and 
culture. It also was implied that the opposition group, by attacking 
the management, represented something antithetical to all these symbols, 
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· This may be an effective appeal; we, unfortunately, have no information 
on its effect. However, it is just as likely to be a poor one, Man-
agement might do well to find out just how many stockholders really 
believe that the present crop of flag-waving directors are of a breed 
more desirable than the insurgent nominees who wave only promises of 
greater dividends. Proxy propaganda is expensive. Why pay for print 
that just fills page-space rather than brain-space? 
STEP 7 THE M~TI-OPPOSITION GROUP CAMPAIGN 
There is finally the job of creating the anti~opposition part of 
the management written campaign. But this job can only be done when 
and if the opposition group reveals its identity, We saw in the anal-
ysis that the major part of the anti ... opposition group campaign was 
devoted to deprecating the past record of the opposition group's nom-
inees for the Board of Directors. This work so obviously hinges on 
the characteristics of the particular case that it must be left mainly 
to the ingenuity of the public relations counsel and the copywriters 
who prepare the material. In a pre-proxy fight campaign there is ob-
viously no opposition group to deprecate, and if the proxy fight never 
comes about, the same condition will hold true. Fort his reason1 we 
can safely lay the plan aside as complete. 
A pre-proxy fight campaign is really nothing new. Many corpora-
tions have been carrying them on for years, only under a less dramatic 
title. A pre-proxy fight campaign is, in effect, just a well designed 
stockholder relations program. But with proxy fights looming on the 
corporate horizon, even the best stockholder relations program must 
make adjustments to prepare for such a distressing contingency. The 
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The seven steps outlined in this paper should help, But they are not 
a panacea, For the best preventative, the best insulation in a corp~rate 
world hot with proxy fights, is good management, 
We seem to be witnessing a drastic change in corporate ownership, 
Stocks are no longer found predominantly either in the safe deposit 
boxes of the highest incomed 20% of the population1 or in the hands o£ 
business-wizened brokers. Stocks are rapidly becoming a ubitquito :s 
type of property, not too much unlike television sets, 
A good management is a management which quickly realizes that many, 
perhaps most, of the people who are buying stock today are completely 
naive about business, A good management is one that takes it upon it-
self to educate such people so they will not be easily duped by cor-
porate manipulators and stock speculators. A good management that 
achieves these things, and much more, will, in the long run, be a long-
run management. 
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The Ayerl-Management reinforces its ~~~~~usip_ess r:c~ 
1. Themes lauding Avery's past achievements at Montgomery 
Ward, and other enterprises. 
2. Themes concerning the safety, security, ~eliability, 
soundness> etc. of the Ward investment under present man-
agement. 
3, Themes stressing the desirability of retaining the pre-
sent management's experience . 
4. Themes concerning Avery's present or future plans for 
Ward, both operational or financial. 
The Averl-Management mak~s quasi-~moti~~~ or symbolip appea.!s 
5. All themes equating Avery (or describing his business 
methods) with sou.rtd business acumen, high (American) prin-
ciples and integrity, stability and conservatism, and 
moderate progress, etc, 
,6, All themes depicting Avery as selfless, protective of 
the interests of others (America), democratic, human, etc, 
7. All themes refering to Avery's desire for anonymity even 
though he works diligently, etc,, and achieves great things, 




The Aveg-Manage~e!lt tries to discredit ~volfson's business record. 
1. All themes reforing to Wolfson's ventures (including 
vlard) as being designed to produce a quick profit for hint-
self, and/or his family and backers~ 
2. All themes (or charts, etc.) designed to show how Wolf-
son's past ventures have actually been poorly managed (but 
falsely depicted to look good). 
3. All themes refering to Wolfson's lack of merchandising 
experience, tho impracticality of his plans for Ward, and the 
impracticality of his promises (or that they can be detri-
mental to vlard) • 
4. Statements that Wolfson has lied or made misleading 
statements about his past ventures and/or his intentions in 
seeking the Ward directorshiP.• 
5. All themes showing that v~olfson is unethical; that he 
forced various companies he controls to buy large blocks of 
.Ward stock; that he represents foul business tactics, etc, 
6. Themes showing that Wolfson is witholding pertinent 
information from the stockholders (as to the nature of his 
plans or the identity of his backers). 
The iwexz-Managcmont tries to associate Wolfson,w~th s~me negative> 
guasi-omotional features or symbols 
7. Themes announcing Wolfson's political support for Fuller 
Warren (for governor of Florida), tne his association with 
the owner of a dog-track during this campaign. 
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8. Themes stating or implying that in attacking Avery~ 
Wolfson is attacking everything inherently /~erican (or 
other things described in pro-Avery sub-category 5). 
9. Themes describing vJolfson as untried and money-hungry. 
10. Actual number of themes used to c~ge W~lfson wit~ 
something1 or to ask a question in such a way as to make 
a char[e• 
NEUTRAL 
Objec~ive reporting material 
1. Biographical themes. 
2. Historical themes ••••• anything which actually happened 
or was said by someone, but which was not used within the 
same paragraph in such a way as to constitute a pro or 
anti theme. 
3. Statistical themes ••••• any information which was pre-
sented, but which was not used, within the same paragraph 
in such a way as to constitute a pro or anti theme. 
Indefinite material 
4. All themes which did not seem to fall into any of the 
other sub-categories, or which was too vague to assure 
reasonable certainty that it could be placed in its proper 
sub-category. 
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NOTE: In pro-Avery sub-category 8 and in anti-Wolfson sub-category 
10, the following instruction vms given. A theme which appears phy-
sically as a charge (question) or refutation, must be recorded in two 
places. It must be recorded in the sub-category which deals with that 
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particular subject, and it must also be recorded as a charge (question) 
or refutation, as the case may be. In determing reliability and fre~ 
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The Wolfson Opposition Commit~ee r~~~-s its past business rec~ 
1. Themes lauding Wolfson's past successes with other com~ 
panies in which he has a controlling interest or is a power, 
(particularly blanket prnlsos). 
2. Themes (charts, figures, statistics) showing increasing 
sales volume, profits, salaried, dividends, services, etc., 
in any of the Wolfson controlled companies. 
3. Statements that Wolfson practices corporate democracy; 
wontt make deals; won't show favoritism to his lilackers or 
family; believes in competition; works for good of stock· 
hold~rs, etc. 
4. Themes about Wolfson's prospective plans for Ward, opera-
ting or financial. 
5. Thomes depicting a Holfson management as permanent .. 
whether~r Ward's or for any of his other enterprises; that 
he is not a speculator; that he does not sell his stock for 
a quick profit and then get out of the company. 
6. Themes (blanket statements) that Wolfson can provide 
better management for Ward; that Wolfson can restore stock-
holder rights, etc. 
The vlolfson ~oup uses some quasi-emotional appeals 
7. Themes concerning Wolfson's confidence, optimims, progres-
siveness, belief in American business growth, etc, 
B. Themes describing Wolfson as ethical, unyielding in 
his (high) principles, and morally qualified to head Ward, 
9. Themes about race, creed, color, etc., being no barrier 
to success in the United States. 
10. Actual number of statements (also scored in above sub~ 
cate.ftories) use<!_to refut~ Avery charge. 
Anti-AVERY MANAGEMENT 
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The Wolfson group tries to discredit~~Ave!l-m~agement•s past record 
~ntgomery 'ltlarci 
1. · Themes concerning Avery's refusal to use large cash 
reserves for expansion of Ward's (because he in&ists there 
will be a depression). 
2. Themes (charts, figures, statistics, etc.) showing that 
Ward's sales, dividends, earnings, salaries, pension plans, 
hospitalization, store expansion, are all poor and/or below 
competitive standards (Sears Roebuck, J.c. Penny, etc.). 
3. Themes that Avery uses autocratic management methods; 
that this has been detrimental to Wardfs; themes concerning 
the staggered election system, poor executive morale, large 
personnel turnover, general lack of corporate democracy, 
neglect of shareholders' rights, etc. 
4. Themes implying Avery is unprincipled in business; that 
he used large amounts of Ward money in the proxy fight with-
out getting stockholder permission;~hat he uoed the 
Annual Report to deprecate Wolfson's intentions; that he · 
made deals with labor; that he used the ~ntirc 1954 Ward 
earnings to raise the dividends just after the proxy 
fight started; that he similarly made slight improvements 
as a smokescreen. 
5. Themes generally deprecating tho Avery-management by 
describing it as reactiona~, do-nothing, senile, ineffi~ 
cient, etc. 
6. Themes showing that Avery has lied, made misleading 
statements to - and is witholding pertinent information 
from .. the lvard stockholders. 
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The ~·velfson campaign tries to attach some negative emotional associa-
tions to ~~very-Management 
7. Themes claiming that Avery is slandering Wolfson 
(and his family) personally. 
8. Themes depicting Avery as representing gloom and 
doom, reaction, no faith in American business progress, 
etc. 
9. Actual number of themes used to charge Avery with 
any of the above (1-8); including questions asked of 
Avery in such a way as to make an accusation.* 
*NOTE: For explanation of scoring pro-Wolfson sub-category 10 and 
anti-Avery sub-category 9~ see NOTE at end of management 
categories~ appendix A. 
NEUTRAL* 





4. Obscure and unclassifiable 
*NOTE: For indicators of NEUTR1\L sub-categories, see Appendix A. 
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Anal'( s 1 s of Wolfwa.td rh ~'""'A.. I An.1~S1~ of Md,no.gerhe~T Mti. te. na.. I: 
-~b C..l. I~~ .2..~ p,~r- ~v'o 0t 1,~•. J."X- [(f.fftA,~ 
Nv..:\,-:(" ANA A-t-J A e~~e.A. l\u-ru ANA A ~-A e~c.ea.. 
GLOSSARY 
SOME DEFINITIONS AND REGULATIONS: 
Proxr Solicitation is defined as "any action intended to influence 
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the giving of a proJCy. 11 Proxy solicitation can be oondu.cted by mail, 
telephone, telegraph, radio or TV, newspaper advertising and in person. 
Proxy solicitation is subject to the rules of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission. 
1he Pro;y Stateme~ contains information which anyone soliciting 
proxies is required to give to the stockholders, including the names 
of the directors to be voted for; a statement of their business expe-
rience and a presentation of any matters to be voted on. 
The Pro3r is simply the ballot which the stockholder executed to cast 
biB vote. In the proxy the stockholder delegates to the individuals' 
names in the Proxy (called the Proey Committee) the power to vote his 
shares. Both committees will send their r espective proY~es to the 
same stockholders £or their signature, The f:o3Y Committee is bound 
to vote as instructed by the stockholder. 
Any Pro3r may be r evoked by the stockholder at any time prior to t he 
Stockholder Meeting. This is mually done by signing a later dated 
proxy. A stockholder can sign both committees• proxies, but the latest 
dated one is the one that will count. 
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An Analysis of Proxy Cont est Campa i gn Appeals - Partic u l e_r ly 
the Mont p- omery Hard Case 
BY \Vi l li am G. Becker 
Using the I'1ont2:omery Wa rd proxy :fight a s it 8 rr:tain ex2rr1p l e , 
, ·and including brief de sed pt ions of t he proxy fi !:"]:ht 8 i nvolvi ng 
the New York Centra l Railroad a nd t he New Have n Ra ilroa d , t h is 
paper eY:arnJnes the phases r-lDO ramificstions of a p~enxy f i :;ht . 
In s o doing , the a ut l:JO r atte:rr1pt s to discern a c orwnon 
pattern for a ll proxy figl-:.ts, and a s st a ted, attemp t s to an::n,rer 
four questions : 
1,. " Do-es there seem to be a p a t t er·n?" 
2 ,. "Is there a s p ecific set of cha racte r istics tha t 
makes a company r i pe for a proxy fight? 11 
3. 11 Ho1...r doe s an opposition group g o about soliciting 
stockho l der supp ort , and T.'lihat po ints do t h ey make 
strong est in their appeal? 11 
4. "Ho1N" does the i ncumbent manag ement grou:p ~o about 
defending itself before easily duped and freque"1t ly 
a lienated stockholders ?" 
l 
I 
